Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Episteme and Logos in later Plato' and 'Collins Dictionary of Philosophy'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
21959 Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
17951 A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: A thing's logos, apparently short as it may be, is implicitly a very rich statement since it ultimately involves familiarity with the whole domain to which that particular object belongs.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234)
     A reaction: He may be wrong that the logos is short, since Aristotle (Idea 12292) says a definition can contain many assertions.
17950 The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: The logos (the definition) is a summary statement of the path within a network of objects that one will have to follow in order to locate a particular member of that network.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234)
     A reaction: I like this because it confirms that Plato (as well as Aristotle) was interested in the particulars rather than in the kinds (which I take to be general truths about particulars).
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21958 Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6457 Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey]
     Full Idea: Whereas a sensation is by definition mental, a sense-datum might be mind-independent.
     From: Godfrey Vesey (Collins Dictionary of Philosophy [1990], p.266)
     A reaction: This seems to be what Russell is getting at in 1912, as he clearly separates sense-data from sensations. Discussions of sense-data always assume they are mental, which may make them redundant - but so might making them physical.