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13331
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Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The whole identity of a part is relevant to whether it is a part, but the identity of the whole makes a part a part. The whole part belongs to the whole as a part. The standard account in terms of time-slices fails to respect this part/whole asymmetry.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §2)
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A reaction:
Hard to follow, but I think the asymmetry is that the wholeness of the part contributes to the wholeness of the whole, while the wholeness of the whole contributes to the parthood of the part. Wholeness does different jobs in different directions. OK?
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13332
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Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
It is the hierarchical conception of sets and their members, rather than the linear conception of set and subset or of aggregate and component, that provides us with the better model for the structure of part-whole in its application to material things.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
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A reaction:
His idea is to give some sort of internal structure. He says of {a,b,c,d} that we can create subsets {a,b} and {c,d} from that. But {{a,b},{c,d}} has given member sets, and he is looking for 'natural' divisions between the members.
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14067
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Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
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Full Idea:
The piece of clay and the statue are 'objects' - that is to say, they can be designated with proper names, and the logic we ordinarily use will still apply.
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From:
Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], I)
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A reaction:
An interesting indication of the way that 'object' is used in modern analytic philosophy, which may not be the way that it is used in ordinary English. The number 'seven', for example, seems to be an object by this criterion.
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13333
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The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The wood is, as it were, a relatively unstructured version of the tree, just as the set {a,b,c,d} is an unstructured counterpart of the set {{a,b},{c,d}}.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
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A reaction:
He is trying to give a modern logicians' account of the Aristotelian concept of 'form' (as applied to matter). It is part of the modern project that objects must be connected to the formalism of mereology or set theory. If it works, are we thereby wiser?
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13326
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A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
First, a thing can be a part in a way that is relative to a time, for example, that a newly installed carburettor is now part of my car, whereas earlier it was not. (This will be called a 'temporary' part).
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
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A reaction:
[Cf Idea 13327 for the 'second' concept of part] I'm immediately uneasy. Being a part seems to be a univocal concept. He seems to be distinguishing parts which are necessary for identity from those which aren't. Fine likes to define by example.
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13327
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A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Second, an object can be a part of another in a way that is not relative to time ('timeless'). It is not appropriate to ask when it is a part. Thus pants and jacket are parts of the suit, atoms of a water molecule, and two pints part of a quart of milk.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
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A reaction:
[cf Idea 13326 for the other concept of 'part'] Again I am uneasy that 'part' could have two meanings. A Life Member is a member in the same way that a normal paid up member is a member.
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13329
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An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
In the 'aggregative' understanding of a sum, it is spread out in time, so that exists whenever any of its components exists (just as it is located at any time wherever any of its components are located).
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
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A reaction:
This works particularly well for something like an ancient forest, which steadily changes its trees. On that view, though, the ship which has had all of its planks replaced will be the identical single sum of planks all the way through. Fine agrees.
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13330
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An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
In the 'compound' notion of sum, the mereological sum is spread out only in space, not also in time. For it to exist at a time, all of its components must exist at the time.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
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A reaction:
It is hard to think of anything to which this applies, apart from for a classical mereologist. Named parts perhaps, like Tom, Dick and Harry. Most things preserve sum identity despite replacement of parts by identical components.
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13328
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Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
I develop a version of hylomorphism, in which the theory of 'rigid embodiment' provides an account of the timeless relation of part, and the theory of 'variable embodiment' is an account of the temporary relation. We must accept two new kinds of whole.
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From:
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
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A reaction:
[see Idea 13326 and Idea 13327 for the two concepts of 'part'] This is easier to take than the two meanings for 'part'. Since Aristotle, everyone has worried about true wholes (atoms, persons?) and looser wholes (houses).
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14076
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Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
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Full Idea:
Essentialism for a class of entities is that for one entity and a condition which it fulfills, the question of whether it necessarily fulfills the condition has a definite answer apart from the way the entity is specified.
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From:
Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], VII)
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A reaction:
Yet another definition of essentialism, but resting, as usual in modern discussions, entirely on the notion of necessity. Kit Fine's challenge is that if you investigate the source of the necessity, it turns out to be an essence.
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14070
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A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
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Full Idea:
A proper name like 'Goliath' denotes a thing in the actual world, and invokes a sortal with certain persistence criteria. Hence its origin makes a statue the statue that it is, and if statues in different worlds have the same beginning, they are the same.
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From:
Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], III)
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A reaction:
Too neat. There are vague, ambiguous and duplicated origins. Persistence criteria can shift during the existence of a thing (like a club which changes its own constitution). In replicated statues, what is the status of the mould?
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14074
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Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
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Full Idea:
As a general law of substitutivity of identicals, Leibniz's Law is false. It is a law about properties and relations, that if two things are identical, they have the same properties and relations. It only works in contexts which attribute those.
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From:
Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], V)
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A reaction:
I'm not convinced about relations, which are not intrinsic properties. Under different descriptions, the relations to human minds might differ.
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14078
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Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
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Full Idea:
It is meaningless to talk of the same concrete thing in different possible worlds, ...but it makes sense to speak of the same individual concept, which is just a function which assigns to each possible world in a set an individual in that world.
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From:
Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], VII)
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A reaction:
A lovely bold response to the problem of transworld identity, but one which needs investigation. It sounds very promising to me. 'Aristotle' is a cocept, not a name. There is no separate category of 'names'. Wow. (Attach dispositions to concepts?).
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