8 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
| 18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Dummett argues that classical logic depends on the choice of the concept of truth as central to the theory of meaning, while for the intuitionist the concept of assertability occupies this position. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 06.5 | |
| A reaction: Since I can assert any nonsense I choose, this presumably means 'warranted' assertability, which is tied to the concept of proof in mathematics. You can reason about falsehoods, or about uninterpreted variables. Can you 'assert' 'Fx'? |
| 19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Classical quantification represents an infinite conjunction or disjunction, and the truth-value is determined by the infinite sum or product of the instances ....but this presupposes that all the instances already possess determinate truth-values. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.246) | |
| A reaction: In the case of the universal quantifier, Dummett is doing no more than citing the classic empiricism objection to induction - that you can't make the universal claim if you don't know all the instances. The claim is still meaningful, though. |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
| 19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: An ability to state the condition for the truth of a sentence is, in effect, no more than an ability to express the content of the sentence in other words. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.224) | |
| A reaction: Alternatively, if you give something other than a paraphrase of the sentence as its meaning (such as a proof of its truth), then you seem to have departed from your target sentence. Can we reduce and eliminate our sentences in this way? |
| 19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: If a sentence is effectively undecidable, the condition which must obtain for it to be true is not one which we are capable of recognising whenever it obtains, or of getting ourselves in a position to do so. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.225) | |
| A reaction: The instances of 'undecidable' sentences are most clearly seen in mathematics, such as the Continuum Hypothesis or Goldbach's Conjecture, or anything involving vast infinite cardinals. But do you need precise truth-conditions for meaning? |
| 19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: If use constitutes meaning, it might seem that use is beyond criticism. ....But such an attitude can, ultimately, be supported onlly by the adoption of a holistic view of language. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.218) | |
| A reaction: Dummett goes on to say that the rejection of the holistic view of mathematical meaning leads to his preference for intuitionistic logic. |
| 1497 | For Anaximenes nature is air, which takes different forms by rarefaction and condensation [Anaximenes, by Simplicius] |
| Full Idea: Unlike Anaximander, Anaximenes' underlying nature is not boundless, but specific, since he says that it is air, and claims that it is thanks to rarefaction and condensation that it manifests in different forms in different things. | |
| From: report of Anaximenes (fragments/reports [c.546 BCE], A5) by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.24.26- |