Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'fragments/reports' and 'Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell]
     Full Idea: Norms (containing one variable) which do not define classes I propose to call 'non-predicative'; those which do define classes I shall call 'predicative'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141)
We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell]
     Full Idea: We need rules for deciding what norms are predicative and what are not, unless we adopt the view (which has much to recommend it) that no norms are predicative. ...[146] A predative propositional function is one which determines a class.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141)
     A reaction: He is referring to his 'no class' theory, which he favoured at that time.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
A false object might give the same presentation as a true one [Arcesilaus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Arcesilaus said that no presentation proceeding from a true object is such that a presentation proceeding from a false one might not also be of the same form. This is the one argument that has held the field down to the present day.
     From: report of Arcesilaus (fragments/reports [c.275 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.24.77