Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Explanations in reply to Mr Bradley' and 'An Enquiry'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly

23025	Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell]
	Full Idea: The progress of philosophy seems to demand that, like science, it should learn to practise induction, to test its premisses by the conclusions to which they lead, and not merely by their apparent self-evidence.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Explanations in reply to Mr Bradley [1899], nr end)
	A reaction: [from Twitter] Love this. It is 'one person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens'. I think all philosophical conclusions, without exception, should be reached by evaluating the final result fully, and not just following a line of argument.

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

21959	Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
	Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
	From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
	A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism

21958	Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
	Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
	From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony

23549	We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M]
	Full Idea: Reid says we naturally operate counterpart principles of veracity and credulity in our testimonial exchanges.
	From: report of Thomas Reid (An Enquiry [1764], 6.24) by Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice 1.3 n11
	A reaction: What you would expect from someone who believed in common sense. Fricker contrasts this with Tyler Burge's greater confidence, and then criticises both (with Reid too cautious and Burge over-confident). She defends a 'low-level' critical awareness.