Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Pragmatism and Objective Truth' and 'Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

21959	Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
	Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
	From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
	A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth

19086	Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth]
	Full Idea: Peirce and Sellars takes Peirce's conception of meaning, on which pragmatism is founded, to support an adequate account of objective truth; James, Dewey and Rorty say it forecloses all possibility of such an account.
	From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.169)
	A reaction: Ah. Very helpful. I thought there was a pragmatic theory of truth, then began to think that it was just a denial of truth. I've long suspected that Peirce is wonderful, and James is not very good (on this topic).

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic

19093	Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth]
	Full Idea: Ancient mathematical concepts were essentially sensory; they were not mathematical in our sense - that is, wholly constituted by their inferential potential.
	From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.187)
	A reaction: The latter view is Frege's, though I suppose it had been emerging for a couple of centuries before him. I like the Greek approach, and would love to see that reunited with the supposedly quite different modern view. (Keith Hossack is attempting it).

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism

21958	Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
	Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
	From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory

19091	Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth]
	Full Idea: As mathematically understood, the world is not an object of experience but instead an object of thought.
	From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.183)
	A reaction: Since I am keen on citing biology to show that science does not have to be mathematical, this nicely shows that there is something wrong with a science which places a large gap between itself and the world.

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts

19088	For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth]
	Full Idea: In the pragmatist view, the meaning of a concept is exhausted by its consequences.
	From: Danielle Macbeth (Pragmatism and Objective Truth [2007], p.173)
	A reaction: I'm unclear why the concept of a volcanic eruption only concerns its dire consequences, and is supposed to contain nothing of its causes. Pragmatists seem to be all future, and no past. Very American.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism

4125	Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
	Full Idea: In Hare's theory I apply a "role-reversal test", and then acquire an actual agglomeration of preferences that apply to the hypothetical situation. The result is utilitarianism.
	From: report of Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
	A reaction: It hits that traditional stumbling block, of why I should care about the preferences of others. Pure reason and empathy are the options (Kant or Hume). I may, however, lack both.

4126	If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
	Full Idea: Hare's version of utilitarianism requires an agent to abandon any deeply held principle or conviction if a large enough aggregate of contrary preferences, of whatever kind, favours a contrary action.
	From: comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
	A reaction: This nicely attacks any impersonal moral theory, whether it is based on reason or preferences. But where did my personal ideals come from?

4127	If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
	Full Idea: If there is to be total identification with others, then if another's preferences are mistaken, the preferences I imagine myself into are equally mistaken, and if 'identification' is the point, they should remain mistaken.
	From: comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
	A reaction: Yes. The core of morality must be judgement. Robots can implement universal utilitarian rules, but they could end up promoting persecutions of minorities.

22483	A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
	Full Idea: We say something prescriptive if and only if, for some act A, some situation S and some person R, if P were to assent (orally) to what we say, and not, in S, do A, he logically must be assenting insincerely.
	From: Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981], p.21), quoted by Philippa Foot - Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? p.190
	A reaction: Foot offers this as Hare's most explicit definition. The use of algebra strikes me as ludicrous. In logic letters have the virtue of not shifting their meaning during an argument, but that is not required here.

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies

4360	By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare]
	Full Idea: By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright.
	From: Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981], Ch.11)
	A reaction: Yes. This is the route which takes us from enlightened self-interest to a vision of true morality. Virtue is found to be its own reward, thought that is not how we became virtuous to begin with.