8 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
14231 | We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins] |
Full Idea: We should interpret philosophers as if their own theory of the meaning of their utterances were true, whether or not we agree with that theory. | |
From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 8) | |
A reaction: This seems to give legitimate grounds for some sorts of ad hominem objections. It would simply be an insult to a philosopher not to believe their theories, and then apply them to what they have said. This includes semantic theories. |
14232 | We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins] |
Full Idea: It is quite standard to interpret sentences of the form 'There are Fs' using a singular quantifier and a singular predicate, but this tradition may be mistaken. | |
From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 8) | |
A reaction: Liggins is clearly in support of the use of plural quantification, referring to 'there are some xs such that'. |
14233 | Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins] |
Full Idea: We can interpret '..is a part of..' as '..are among..': the xs are a part of the ys just when the xs are among the ys (though if the ys are 'one' then they would not have parts). | |
From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 9) | |
A reaction: The trouble is that this still leaves us with gerrymandered 'parts', in the form of xs that are scattered randomly among the ys. That's not what we mean by 'part'. No account of identity works if it leaves out coherent structure. |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
Full Idea: Searle originally directed the Chinese Room against machine intentionality rather than consciousness, arguing that it is "understanding" that the room lacks,….but on Searle's view intentionality requires consciousness. | |
From: report of John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by David J.Chalmers - The Conscious Mind 4.9.4 | |
A reaction: I doubt whether 'understanding' is a sufficiently clear and distinct concept to support Searle's claim. Understanding comes in degrees, and we often think and act with minimal understanding. |
7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
Full Idea: There is nothing remotely like genuine understanding in any hunk of programming small enough to imagine readily. | |
From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1 | |
A reaction: We mustn't hide behind 'complexity', but I think Dennett is right. It is important to think of speed as well as complexity. Searle gives the impression that he knows exactly what 'understanding' is, but I doubt if anyone else does. |
7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
Full Idea: The argument that begins "this little bit of brain activity doesn't understand Chinese, and neither does this bigger bit..." is headed for the unwanted conclusion that even the activity of the whole brain won't account for understanding Chinese. | |
From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1 | |
A reaction: In other words, Searle is guilty of a fallacy of composition (in negative form - parts don't have it, so whole can't have it). Dennett is right. The whole shebang of the full brain will obviously do wonderful (and commonplace) things brain bits can't. |