6 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
17744 | De Morgan started the study of relations and their properties [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
Full Idea: De Morgan started the sustained interest in the study of relations and their properties. | |
From: report of Augustus De Morgan (On the Syllogism IV [1859]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1 |
13501 | De Morgan found inferences involving relations, which eluded Aristotle's syllogistic [De Morgan, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: There was a prejudice against relations (in favour of properties) but De Morgan and others that impeccable inferences turn on relations and elude Aristotle's syllogistic. Thus: All horses are animals. Hence, all heads of horses are heads of animals. | |
From: report of Augustus De Morgan (On the Syllogism IV [1859]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 4 | |
A reaction: This is actually an early example of modern analytic philosophy in action. You start with the inferences, and then work back to the ontology and the definition of concepts. But in pinning down such concepts, do we miss their full meaning? |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
Full Idea: An intelligible metaphysics will assign a central place to the idea of people (= speakers) with a location in public space and time. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: The 'location' is the interesting bit, requiring people to be bodies, not abstractions. A big, plausible claim, but hard to prove. |
4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Sentences held true (the linguistic representatives of beliefs) determine the meanings of the words they contain. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §II) | |
A reaction: Maybe. Historically, truth and belief presumably precede words and sentences. But words separate off from beliefs very easily. I'm not convinced. Words initiate language, not beliefs? |