7 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
7006 | Observing irrelevant items supports both 'all x are y' and 'all x are non-y', revealing its absurdity [Schofield,J] |
Full Idea: Although Hempel's raven paradox produces an absurdity of irrelevant observations, we can ignore it because (unlike good observations) observing a white handbag supports the contradictions of 'ravens are black' and 'ravens are non-black'. | |
From: Jonathan Schofield (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The idea of 'eliminating it from our enquiries' cannot be totally irrational (e.g. in detective work), but it is only seriously sensible in a restricted domain (such as a country house) |
22692 | A work can be morally and artistically excellent, despite rejecting moral truth [John,E] |
Full Idea: A work that rejects moral truth can be artistically excellent, in part because of its moral content. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], Intr) | |
A reaction: She cites the film 'Trainspotting', about desperate drug addicts, because it gives an amoral insight into their world. |
22693 | The works we value most are in sympathy with our own moral views [John,E] |
Full Idea: The works we tend to value most highly are ones that are in sympathy with the moral views we actually accept. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: I would have to endorse this. She admits that we may rate other works very highly, but they won't appear on our list of favourites. This fact may well distort philosophical discussions of morality and art. |
22694 | We should understand what is morally important in a story, without having to endorse it [John,E] |
Full Idea: Our responses to literature should show that we grasp whatever counts as morally important within the narrative, but not necessarily that we judge and feel in the way deemed appropriate by the work. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], 'Accommodating') | |
A reaction: She gives as an example a story by Hemingway which places a high value on the courageous hunting of big game. A second example is the total amorality of a Highsmith novel. This idea seems exactly right to me. |
22695 | We value morality in art because that is what we care about - but it is a contingent fact [John,E] |
Full Idea: Moral value is valuable in art because people care about moral value. This runs deep, but it is a contingent matter, and the value of morality in art hinges on art's need to provide something precious to us. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], 'Contingency') | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right. Thrillers are written with very little moral concern, for a readership which cares about brave and exciting deeds. Even there, violence has its ethics. |