6 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
22320 | An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: What I once called 'objects', simples, were simply what I could refer to without running the risk of their possible non-existence. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.72), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 52 'Simp' | |
A reaction: For most of us, you can refer to something because you take it to be an object. For these Fregean influenced guys (e.g. Hale) something is an object because you can refer to it. Why don't they use 'object*' for their things? |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
3648 | Empiricists are collecting ants; rationalists are spinning spiders; and bees do both [Bacon] |
Full Idea: Empiricists are like ants; they collect and put to use; but rationalists, like spiders, spin threads out of themselves. (…and bees follow the middle way, of collecting material and transforming it). | |
From: Francis Bacon (Cogitata et Visa [1607]) | |
A reaction: Nice (and so concisely expressed). Bees seem to be just more intelligent and energetic empiricists. |
18283 | Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.85), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 17 | |
A reaction: Hence for a long time the study of language seemed to be the way to do metaphysics. Now they study mathematical logic, with the same hope. |
18282 | You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: It isn't possible to believe something for which you cannot imagine some kind of verification. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.200), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr' | |
A reaction: In 1930 LW was calling this his 'old principle'. As it stands here it is too vague to assert very much. |