6 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
| 13547 | Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter] |
| Full Idea: Weak Limitation of Size: If there are no more Fs than Gs and the Gs form a collection, then Fs form a collection. Strong Limitation of Size: A property F fails to be collectivising iff there are as many Fs as there are objects. | |
| From: report of George Boolos (Iteration Again [1989]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 13.5 |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
| 17527 | Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird] |
| Full Idea: There is evidence that the concept of causation is innate, or that we are primed to acquire it very early in life, within months at most. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Causation and the Manifestation of Powers [2010], p.167) | |
| A reaction: Bird doesn't give any references. This is important for our understanding of induction. Creatures seem to learn from a single instance, rather than waiting for habit to be ingrained by many instances. They must infer a cause. |
| 17528 | The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The analysis of causation in terms of dispositions provides no conceptual reduction, but it does provide insight into the metaphysics of causation. We then know what causation is - it is the stimulation and manifestation of a disposition. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Causation and the Manifestation of Powers [2010], p.167) | |
| A reaction: I would say that it offers the essence of causation, by giving a basic explanation of it. See Mumford/Lill Anjum on this. |
| 17526 | The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird] |
| Full Idea: The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and condition, ...but when the smoke sets off the fire alarm, the smoke is the cause, whereas the presence of the alarm is just the condition. | |
| From: Alexander Bird (Causation and the Manifestation of Powers [2010], p.162) | |
| A reaction: Bird defends the idea that causes are what stimulate dispositions to act. |