Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'The iterative conception of Set' and 'Aristotle's Theory of Substance'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
21959 Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
18192 Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy]
     Full Idea: For Boolos, the Replacement Axioms go beyond the iterative conception.
     From: report of George Boolos (The iterative conception of Set [1971]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.3
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
12354 A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin]
     Full Idea: A 'categorial' property is a property something has by virtue of being or having an item from one of the categories.
     From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], V.5)
     A reaction: I deny that these are 'properties'. A thing is categorised according to its properties. To denote the category as a further property is the route to madness (well, to a regress).
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
12358 Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin]
     Full Idea: Substance [ousia] is a principle [arché] and a kind of cause [aitia].
     From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], 1041a09)
     A reaction: The fact that substance is a cause is also the reason why substance is the ultimate explanation. It is here that I take the word 'power' to capture best what Aristotle has in mind.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
12346 Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin]
     Full Idea: The form of a thing (of a given kind) explains why certain matter constitutes a thing of that kind, and with this, Aristotle holds, we have reached explanatory bedrock.
     From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: We must explain an individual tiger which is unusually docile. It must have an individual form which makes it a tiger, but also an individual form which makes it docile.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21958 Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)