Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'The Theory of Transfinite Numbers' and 'Shame and Necessity'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


14 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
A set is a collection into a whole of distinct objects of our intuition or thought [Cantor]
     Full Idea: A set is any collection into a whole M of definite, distinct objects m ... of our intuition or thought.
     From: George Cantor (The Theory of Transfinite Numbers [1897], p.85), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.2
     A reaction: This is the original conception of a set, which hit trouble with Russell's Paradox. Cantor's original definition immediately invites thoughts about the status of vague objects.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Cantor needed Power Set for the reals, but then couldn't count the new collections [Cantor, by Lavine]
     Full Idea: Cantor grafted the Power Set axiom onto his theory when he needed it to incorporate the real numbers, ...but his theory was supposed to be theory of collections that can be counted, but he didn't know how to count the new collections.
     From: report of George Cantor (The Theory of Transfinite Numbers [1897]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite I
     A reaction: I take this to refer to the countability of the sets, rather than the members of the sets. Lavine notes that counting was Cantor's key principle, but he now had to abandon it. Zermelo came to the rescue.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: There is a deluded Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom will totally coincide.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], VI - p.158)
There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: There is a problem of free will only for those who think that the notion of voluntary can be metaphysically deepened.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.68)
     A reaction: Years later, I now see that his refers to a pet hate of mine in discussions of free will, which is the idea that a person can have something called 'ultimate' responsibility for an action (which is the 'deep' version of 'you did it').
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
     Full Idea: Williams has shown that whether an action was weakness of will depends on an evaluation after the event, as in the question of whether Gauguin was right to abandon his family to pursue his art.
     From: report of Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993]) by John Cottingham - Reason, Emotions and Good Life p.1
     A reaction: The 'Gauguin Problem' is that Gauguin's actions only become weakness of will if the pictures are no good, and he can't know that till he's painted them. Good point.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The four elements of any conception of responsibility are cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.53)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: In what I have done, the guilt points in one direction towards what has happened to others, and the shame in another direction to what I am.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.92)
     A reaction: Not convinced. I think shame has the fear of being observed as an inescapable component. Even when alone shame involves imagining what others might think.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: There was moral progress in the ancient Greek world, notably to the extent that the idea of areté, human excellence, was freed to some extent from determination by social position.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], I - p.7)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Duty in some abstract modern sense is largely unknown to the Greeks, in particular to archaic Greeks.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], II - p.41)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The conception of the moral self as characterless leaves only a limited positive role to other people in one's moral life.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.95)
If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If we think the power of reason is not enough by itself to distinguish good and bad, then we would hope that people have limited autonomy, that there is an internalised other in them that carries some social weight.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.100)
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: There is a "problem of evil" only for those who expect the world to be good.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.68)