9 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
| 13191 | The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It is the same to look for perfection in an essence and in the properties that flow from an essence. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Wolff [1715], 1715.05.18) | |
| A reaction: It is helpful to have Leibniz spelling out his commitment to the traditional view of essence, as that from which the more evident properties flow. |
| 2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: Belief might be accorded the status of core or chief propositional attitude. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.126) |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
| 2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: In contrast with Brentano and Husserl, consciousness or attention are no longer seen as essential to intentionality. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as being correct, although there seem to be plenty of current philosophers who do not accept it (e.g. Searle). I think philosophy of mind may be stuck in the dark ages if thinkers don't accept this proposal. |
| 2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: It is possible to give an account of concept-formation without a language of thought or representation, based on perception, which in the brain seems to involve information without representation. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.66) | |
| A reaction: This claim strikes me as being a little too confident. One might say that a concept IS a representation. However, the perception of several horses might 'blur' together to form a generalised horse. |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: How else, other than via some form of representational system, could a human organism contain information as a content over which it could operate or 'attitudinise'? | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'representational'. In its vaguest sense, this is just a tautology - content must be held in the mind in some form or other, but that tells us nothing. |
| 2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: It is not easy to employ our folk psychology in the understanding of persons in a very different culture. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.241) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a highly significant problem for the friends of folk psychology. It also breaks down in extreme situations, or with mental illness. It seems closer to culture than to brain structure. |
| 2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: I cannot say I am simply thinking but not thinking about anything. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Hard to disagree. However, I can plausibly reply to 'What are you thinking?' with 'Nothing', if my consciousness is freewheeling. Utterly disconnected content isn't really what we call 'thinking'. |