Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Recent Debates on the A Priori' and 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
21959 Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
9226 If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Unlike logic, in the case of mathematics there may be no genuine conflict between alternative theories: it is natural to think that different theories, if both consistent, are simply about different subjects.
     From: Hartry Field (Recent Debates on the A Priori [2005], 7)
     A reaction: For this reason Field places logic at the heart of questions about a priori knowledge, rather than mathematics. My intuitions make me doubt his proposal. Given the very simple basis of, say, arithmetic, I would expect all departments to connect.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
12699 A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
12700 Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
     A reaction: Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
12736 If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
     Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
     A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21958 Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
12698 Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I believe that there is in every body a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.2010), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: Note that he never says that there is any intelligence present. This eventually becomes his monadology, but Leibniz is the most obvious post-Greek philosopher to flirt with panpsychism.