5 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
20183 | So-called 'though experiments' are just philosophers observing features of the world [Cappelen] |
Full Idea: What are called 'thought experiments' in philosophy are in effect just philosophers drawing our attention to interesting features of the world. | |
From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 11.3) | |
A reaction: Thought experiments are said to rely (perhaps excessively) on 'intuition', but Cappelen says intuition is irrelevant, because we are merely making judgements. It think they ARE experiments, if one feature varies while the rest is held steady. |
527 | Everything exists which anyone perceives [Metrodorus of Chios] |
Full Idea: Everything exists which anyone perceives. | |
From: Metrodorus (Chi) (Natural Science (lost) [c.340 BCE], B2), quoted by (who?) - where? | |
A reaction: cf Berkeley and Epicurus. This misses out the problem of perceptual error, such as a square tower looking round from a distance, or one person in a group thinking they have seen something. It is still a good criterion, though! |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
20182 | The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed [Cappelen] |
Full Idea: Careful study of uses of 'intuitive' will reveal that it often plays no significant argumentative role, and that removal will improve overall argumentative transparency. | |
From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 04.1) | |
A reaction: This is a key part of Cappelen's argument that 'intuition' is a rather empty concept, and that philosophers do not really rely on it. In effect, he is consigning it to mere rhetoric. He gives lots of examples in support. |