Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'The Mental Life of Some Machines' and 'Introduction to Philosophical Papers II'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Humean supervenience says the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact. We have a geometry of external relations of spatio-temporal distance between points, and local qualities at points. …In short: we have an arrangement of qualities.
     From: David Lewis (Introduction to Philosophical Papers II [1986], p.ix-x)
     A reaction: [compressed] This is the key fundamental tenet of David Lewis's philosophy. He names it after Hume because it contains no necessary connections. It is 'supervenient' because all worldly truths reduce to and depend on the mosaic. His thesis is contingent.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: In machine functionalism, pain tokens (individual instances of pain) are identical with particular neurophysiological states, but pain itself, the kind, universal, or 'type', can be identified only with something more abstract.
     From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Mental Life of Some Machines [1967]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.6
     A reaction: This is where the "what is it like?" question seems important. Pain doesn't seem like a physical object, or an abstract idea. Personally I think the former is more likely to be correct than the latter. Causation by pain is not like causation by gravity.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another.
     From: David Lewis (Introduction to Philosophical Papers II [1986])
     A reaction: Basing laws on this picture is what Lewis calls 'Humean Supervenience'.