Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'works' and 'Contextualism Contested'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Some continental philosophers are relativists - Baudrillard, for example [Baudrillard, by Critchley]
     Full Idea: There are philosophers in the continental tradition who are relativists - Baudrillard, for example.
     From: report of Jean Baudrillard (works [1976]) by Simon Critchley - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.192
     A reaction: This remark is in the context of Critchley denying that most continental philosophers are relativists.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee]
     Full Idea: The fact that different standards are routinely applied in making an evaluative judgement does not imply the correctness of semantic contextualism about the contents of judgements. ..We can't infer different truth conditions from differing standards.
     From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.51)
     A reaction: This is the basic objection to contextualism from the 'invariantist' camp, which says there are facts about good judgement and justification, despite contextual shifts. My sympathies are with the contextualists (on this one).
Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee]
     Full Idea: Maybe every issue about knowledge (Gettier problem, scientific knowledge, justification, scepticism) has been discussed solely in the single 'really and truly' context.
     From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.53)
     A reaction: This seems not to be true, if we contrast Descartes' desire for total certainty with Peirce's fallibilism. It seems to me that modern philosophy has deliberately relaxed the standard, in order to make some sort of knowledge possible. Cf. Idea 12894.