Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'How to Read Foucault' and 'Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


4 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
Post-structuralism focused on exterior determinants of thought, rather than the thinker [Oksala]
     Full Idea: Post-structuralism was characterised by the denial of the human being as the privileged object of philosophical analysis, focusing instead on the social, linguistic and unconscious determinants of thought.
     From: Johanna Oksala (How to Read Foucault [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: I'm new to this, and so far this sounds the same as structralism, so I'll have to keep going. I presume it is the same as the rejection of the author when interpreting literature (as in Barthes?). Structuralism was 'non-historical'.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
     Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalists cannot explain the resemblance between particulars in terms of their properties, because they explain particulars' properties in terms of their resemblances.
     From: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress [2001], p.397), quoted by Douglas Edwards - Properties 5.5.1
     A reaction: While resemblance does seem to be a primitive fact of experience, and it points us towards the properties, to say that resemblance explains properties is obviously (as so often...) getting things the wrong way round. Properties ARE resemblances??
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)