Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'The Rationalists' and 'Remembrance of Things Past'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham]
     Full Idea: Descartes was a dualist about substance, Spinoza was a monist, and Leibniz was a pluralist (an infinity of substances).
     From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.76)
     A reaction: Spinoza is appealing. We posit a substance, as the necessary basis for existence, but it is unclear how more than one substance can be differentiated. If mind is a separate substance, why isn't iron? Why aren't numbers?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham]
     Full Idea: The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics.
     From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.75)
     A reaction: The idea of 'substance' has had an interesting revival in modern philosophy (though not, obviously, in physics). Maybe physics and philosophy have views of reality which are not complementary, but are rivals.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
When we need to do something, we depute an inner servant to remind us of it [Proust]
     Full Idea: Whenever we have something definite to do at a given moment, we depute a certain person inside us who is accustomed to that sort of duty to keep an eye on the clock and warn us of the time. This inner servant reminded me that Albertine was coming soon.
     From: Marcel Proust (Remembrance of Things Past [1922], Cities.2.1)
     A reaction: I think Proust is wrong that we 'depute' this servant. I think it comes as a built-in feature, and the servant could never be abandoned or sacked, no matter how poor the service. Each of us is a team, which includes servants.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]
     Full Idea: The rationalist view of causation takes it that to make effects intelligible, it must be shown that they are in principle deducible from their causes.
     From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.92)
     A reaction: This has intuitive appeal, but deduction is only possible with further premises, such as the laws of physics. The effects of human behaviour look a bit tricky, even if we cause them.