55 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
| 9738 | Each line of a truth table is a model [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: Each line of a truth table is, in effect, a model. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: I find this comment illuminating. It is being connected with the more complex models of modal logic. Each line of a truth table is a picture of how the world might be. |
| 9727 | Modal logic adds □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly) to classical logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: For modal logic we add to the syntax of classical logic two new unary operators □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly). | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.3) |
| 9726 | We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x'. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.5) |
| 9737 | The symbol ||- is the 'forcing' relation; 'Γ ||- P' means that P is true in world Γ [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The symbol ||- is used for the 'forcing' relation, as in 'Γ ||- P', which means that P is true in world Γ. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
| 13136 | The prefix σ names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: A 'prefix' is a finite sequence of positive integers. A 'prefixed formula' is an expression of the form σ X, where σ is a prefix and X is a formula. A prefix names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
| 13727 | A 'constant' domain is the same for all worlds; 'varying' domains can be entirely separate [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: In 'constant domain' semantics, the domain of each possible world is the same as every other; in 'varying domain' semantics, the domains need not coincide, or even overlap. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.5) |
| 9734 | Modern modal logic introduces 'accessibility', saying xRy means 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: Modern modal logic takes into consideration the way the modal relates the possible worlds, called the 'accessibility' relation. .. We let R be the accessibility relation, and xRy reads as 'y is accessible from x. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: There are various types of accessibility, and these define the various modal logics. |
| 9736 | A 'model' is a frame plus specification of propositions true at worlds, written < G,R,||- > [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
|
Full Idea:
A 'model' is a frame plus a specification of which propositional letters are true at which worlds. It is written as |
|
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
| 9735 | A 'frame' is a set G of possible worlds, with an accessibility relation R, written < G,R > [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
|
Full Idea:
A 'frame' consists of a non-empty set G, whose members are generally called possible worlds, and a binary relation R, on G, generally called the accessibility relation. We say the frame is the pair |
|
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
| 9741 | Accessibility relations can be 'reflexive' (self-referring), 'transitive' (carries over), or 'symmetric' (mutual) [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: A relation R is 'reflexive' if every world is accessible from itself; 'transitive' if the first world is related to the third world (ΓRΔ and ΔRΩ → ΓRΩ); and 'symmetric' if the accessibility relation is mutual. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.7) | |
| A reaction: The different systems of modal logic largely depend on how these accessibility relations are specified. There is also the 'serial' relation, which just says that any world has another world accessible to it. |
| 13141 | Negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: General tableau rule for negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
| 13138 | Disj: a) if σ ¬(X∨Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X∨Y then σ X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: General tableau rules for disjunctions: a) if σ ¬(X ∨ Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X ∨ Y then σ X or σ Y | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
| 13142 | Existential: a) if σ ◊X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□X then σ.n ¬X [n is new] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: General tableau rules for existential modality: a) if σ ◊ X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□ X then σ.n ¬X , where n introduces some new world (rather than referring to a world that can be seen). | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: Note that the existential rule of ◊, usually read as 'possibly', asserts something about a new as yet unseen world, whereas □ only refers to worlds which can already be seen, |
| 13144 | T reflexive: a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: System T reflexive rules (also for B, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
| 13145 | D serial: a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: System D serial rules (also for T, B, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
| 13146 | B symmetric: a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: System B symmetric rules (also for S5): a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [where n is a world which already occurs] | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
| 13147 | 4 transitive: a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: System 4 transitive rules (also for K4, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [where n is a world which already occurs] | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
| 13148 | 4r rev-trans: a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: System 4r reversed-transitive rules (also for S5): a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [where n is a world which already occurs] | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
| 9740 | If a proposition is possibly true in a world, it is true in some world accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: If a proposition is possibly true in a world, then it is also true in some world which is accessible from that world. That is: Γ ||- ◊X ↔ for some Δ ∈ G, ΓRΔ then Δ ||- X. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
| 9739 | If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, it is true in all worlds accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, then it is also true in all worlds which are accessible from that world. That is: Γ ||- □X ↔ for every Δ ∈ G, if ΓRΔ then Δ ||- X. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
| 13137 | Conj: a) if σ X∧Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X∧Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: General tableau rules for conjunctions: a) if σ X ∧ Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X ∧ Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
| 13140 | Bicon: a)if σ(X↔Y) then σ(X→Y) and σ(Y→X) b) [not biconditional, one or other fails] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: General tableau rules for biconditionals: a) if σ (X ↔ Y) then σ (X → Y) and σ (Y → X) b) if σ ¬(X ↔ Y) then σ ¬(X → Y) or σ ¬(Y → X) | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
| 13139 | Implic: a) if σ ¬(X→Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X→Y then σ ¬X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: General tableau rules for implications: a) if σ ¬(X → Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X → Y then σ ¬X or σ Y | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
| 13143 | Universal: a) if σ ¬◊X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □X then σ.m X [m exists] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: General tableau rules for universal modality: a) if σ ¬◊ X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □ X then σ.m X , where m refers to a world that can be seen (rather than introducing a new world). | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: Note that the universal rule of □, usually read as 'necessary', only refers to worlds which can already be seen, whereas possibility (◊) asserts some thing about a new as yet unseen world. |
| 13149 | S5: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: Simplified S5 rules: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X. 'n' picks any world; in a) and b) 'k' asserts a new world; in c) and d) 'k' refers to a known world | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
| 9742 | The system K has no accessibility conditions [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The system K has no frame conditions imposed on its accessibility relation. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) | |
| A reaction: The system is named K in honour of Saul Kripke. |
| 13114 | □P → P is not valid in D (Deontic Logic), since an obligatory action may be not performed [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: System D is usually thought of as Deontic Logic, concerning obligations and permissions. □P → P is not valid in D, since just because an action is obligatory, it does not follow that it is performed. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.12.2 Ex) |
| 9743 | The system D has the 'serial' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The system D has the 'serial' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must have some world which is accessible to it. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
| 9744 | The system T has the 'reflexive' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The system T has the 'reflexive' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must be accessible to itself. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
| 9746 | The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, if a relation holds between worlds 1 and 2 and worlds 2 and 3, it must hold between worlds 1 and 3. The relation carries over. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
| 9745 | The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must be accessible to itself, and any relation between worlds must be mutual. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
| 9747 | The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world is accessible to itself, and accessibility carries over a series of worlds. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
| 9748 | System S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The system S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world is self-accessible, and accessibility is mutual, and it carries over a series of worlds. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) | |
| A reaction: S5 has total accessibility, and hence is the most powerful system (though it might be too powerful). |
| 9404 | Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: P→◊P is usually considered to be valid, but its converse, ◊P→P is not, so (by Frege's own criterion) P and possibly-P differ in conceptual content, and there is no reason why logic should not be widened to accommodate this. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: Frege had denied that modality affected the content of a proposition (1879:p.4). The observation here is the foundation for the need for a modal logic. |
| 13112 | In epistemic logic knowers are logically omniscient, so they know that they know [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: In epistemic logic the knower is treated as logically omniscient. This is puzzling because one then cannot know something and yet fail to know that one knows it (the Principle of Positive Introspection). | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.11) | |
| A reaction: This is nowadays known as the K-K Problem - to know, must you know that you know. Broadly, we find that externalists say you don't need to know that you know (so animals know things), but internalists say you do need to know that you know. |
| 13111 | Read epistemic box as 'a knows/believes P' and diamond as 'for all a knows/believes, P' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: In epistemic logic we read Υ as 'KaP: a knows that P', and ◊ as 'PaP: it is possible, for all a knows, that P' (a is an individual). For belief we read them as 'BaP: a believes that P' and 'CaP: compatible with everything a believes that P'. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.11) | |
| A reaction: [scripted capitals and subscripts are involved] Hintikka 1962 is the source of this. Fitting and Mendelsohn prefer □ to read 'a is entitled to know P', rather than 'a knows that P'. |
| 13113 | F: will sometime, P: was sometime, G: will always, H: was always [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: We introduce four future and past tense operators: FP: it will sometime be the case that P. PP: it was sometime the case that P. GP: it will always be the case that P. HP: it has always been the case that P. (P itself is untensed). | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.10) | |
| A reaction: Temporal logic begins with A.N. Prior, and starts with □ as 'always', and ◊ as 'sometimes', but then adds these past and future divisions. Two different logics emerge, taking □ and ◊ as either past or as future. |
| 13728 | The Barcan says nothing comes into existence; the Converse says nothing ceases; the pair imply stability [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The Converse Barcan says nothing passes out of existence in alternative situations. The Barcan says that nothing comes into existence. The two together say the same things exist no matter what the situation. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.9) | |
| A reaction: I take the big problem to be that these reflect what it is you want to say, and that does not keep stable across a conversation, so ordinary rational discussion sometimes asserts these formulas, and 30 seconds later denies them. |
| 13729 | The Barcan corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse to monotonicity [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The Barcan formula corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse Barcan formula corresponds to monotonicity. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 6.3) |
| 9725 | 'Predicate abstraction' abstracts predicates from formulae, giving scope for constants and functions [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: 'Predicate abstraction' is a key idea. It is a syntactic mechanism for abstracting a predicate from a formula, providing a scoping mechanism for constants and function symbols similar to that provided for variables by quantifiers. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], Pref) |
| 13730 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: Equality has caused much grief for modal logic. Many of the problems, which have struck at the heart of the coherence of modal logic, stem from the apparent violations of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 7.1) | |
| A reaction: Thus when I say 'I might have been three inches taller', presumably I am referring to someone who is 'identical' to me, but who lacks one of my properties. A simple solution is to say that the person is 'essentially' identical. |
| 13725 | □ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: If □ is to be sensitive to the quality of the truth of a proposition in its scope, then it must be sensitive as to whether an object is picked out by an essential property or by a contingent one. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.3) | |
| A reaction: This incredibly simple idea strikes me as being powerful and important. ...However, creating illustrative examples leaves me in a state of confusion. You try it. They cite '9' and 'number of planets'. But is it just nominal essence? '9' must be 9. |
| 13731 | Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The property of 'possibly being a Republican' is as much a property of Bill Clinton as is 'being a democrat'. So we don't peel off his properties from world to world. Hence the bundle theory fits our treatment of objects better than bare particulars. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 7.3) | |
| A reaction: This bundle theory is better described in recent parlance as the 'modal profile'. I am reluctant to talk of a modal truth about something as one of its 'properties'. An objects, then, is a bundle of truths? |
| 13726 | Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| Full Idea: The main technical problem with counterpart theory is that the being-a-counterpart relation is, in general, neither symmetric nor transitive, so no natural logic of equality is forthcoming. | |
| From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: That is, nothing is equal to a counterpart, either directly or indirectly. |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
| 7404 | Nations are not obliged to help one-another, but are obliged not to harm one another [Grotius, by Tuck] |
| Full Idea: Grotius explored the implications of the idea that nation-states were under no obligation to help one another, but they were obliged not to harm each other. | |
| From: report of Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: This is quite a striking disanalogy between accepted personal morality and political morality. There are signs in recent years of some recognition that other nations should not just sit and watch suffering. |
| 7402 | Everyone has a right of self-preservation, and harming others is usually unjustifiable [Grotius, by Tuck] |
| Full Idea: Grotius said that all men would agree that everyone has a fundamental right to preserve themselves, and that wanton or unnecessary injury to another person is unjustifiable. | |
| From: report of Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Who cares if it is 'justifiable'? Do I have to 'justify' killing a mosquito if it lands on my arm? Grotius is taking a step beyond saying that people should defend themselves, to say that they have a 'right' to - the only truly basic right. |
| 21938 | Democracy needs respect for individuality, but the 'community of friends' implies strict equality [Grotius] |
| Full Idea: There is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity, but there is no democracy with the 'community of friends' without the calculation of majorities, without identifiable representable subjects, all equal. | |
| From: Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 7 | |
| A reaction: [source not given] Derrida calls this conflict 'tragic'. The obvious reply is that equality is not an absolute. We can be equal in voting rights while being unequal in height or musical talent. |
| 19845 | A person is free to renounce their state, as long as it is not a moment of crisis [Grotius, by Rousseau] |
| Full Idea: Grotius thinks that each person can renounce his state and leave the country. (n15: provided it is not to evade one's duty the moment the homeland needs us; this would be criminal and punishable; it would not be withdrawal, but desertion) | |
| From: report of Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]) by Jean-Jacques Rousseau - The Social Contract (tr Cress) III.18 | |
| A reaction: The obvious example is Britons going to America in 1939, or (more controversially) conscripts going to Canada to avoid fighting in Vietnam. I'm unclear whether the idea in the note is that of Grotius or of Rousseau). Is tax exile OK, then? |
| 22133 | Grotius and Pufendorf based natural law on real (rather than idealised) humanity [Grotius, by Ford,JD] |
| Full Idea: Grotius and Pufendorf transformed the natural law tradition by starting from identifiable traits of human nature rather than ideas about what human beings ought to be. | |
| From: report of Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]) by J.D. Ford - Pufendorf, Samuel p.863 |
| 7406 | A natural right of self-preservation is balanced by a natural law to avoid unnecessary harm [Grotius, by Tuck] |
| Full Idea: For Grotius, there was a fundamental 'natural right' of self-preservation upon which all known moralities and codes of social behaviour must have been constructed, but it is balanced by a fundament duty or 'natural law' to abstain from harming others. | |
| From: report of Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This theory has the virtue of economy, but I don't see how you can clearly justify those particular natural rights and laws, without allowing others to creep in, such as a right to a decent share of food, or a law requiring some fairness. |
| 7403 | Grotius ignored elaborate natural law theories, preferring a basic right of self-preservation [Grotius, by Tuck] |
| Full Idea: Grotius said there was a minimum core of morality (based on self-preservation), and disregarded the elaborate accounts of principles of natural law which Aristotelians had always sought to develop. | |
| From: report of Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Aquinas would be the key Aristotelian here. I tend towards the Aristotelian view. If you go for the minimal view, it is not clear why there is a 'right' to self-preservation, rather than a mere desire for it. |
| 23585 | It is permissible in a just cause to capture a place in neutral territory [Grotius] |
| Full Idea: It is permissible for one who is waging a just war to take possession of a place situated in a country free from hostilities. | |
| From: Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625], II.ii.x), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 15 n | |
| A reaction: This rejects Combatant Equality, allowing the just to do what is morally forbidden to the unjust. |
| 6892 | Moral principles have some validity without a God commanding obedience [Grotius, by Mautner] |
| Full Idea: In the Prolegomena to his work there is a famous statement that moral principles laid down in the work would have some degree of validity even if there was no God commanding obedience. | |
| From: report of Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.229 | |
| A reaction: I am not clear why Grotius felt obliged to qualify his claim with the phrase 'some degree'. I don't see how God's command can affect the 'validity' of morality, or how there can be a middle ground between dependence on and independence of God. |