Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Sentences' and 'Structuralism'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

21959	Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
	Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
	From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
	A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism

8921	Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman]
	Full Idea: With developments in modern mathematics, structuralist ideas have become commonplace. We study 'abstract structures', having relations without regard to the objects. As Hilbert famously said, items of furniture would do.
	From: Geoffrey Hellman (Structuralism [2007], §1)
	A reaction: Hilbert is known as a Formalist, which suggests that modern Structuralism is a refined and more naturalist version of the rather austere formalist view. Presumably the sofa can't stand for six, so a structural definition of numbers is needed.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism

8922	Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman]
	Full Idea: There is the tantalizing possibility that perhaps mathematical objects 'have no nature' at all, beyond their 'structural role'.
	From: Geoffrey Hellman (Structuralism [2007], §1)
	A reaction: This would fit with a number being a function rather than an object. We are interested in what cars do, not the bolts that hold them together? But the ontology of mathematics is quite separate from how you do mathematics.

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

18528	The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol]
	Full Idea: It appears that a single thing, which must be imagined as some sort of interval [intervallum] existing between two things, cannot exist in extramental reality, but only in the intellect.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], I fols318 v a-b), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7
	A reaction: This is the standard medieval denial of the existence of real relations. It contrasts with post-Russell ontology, which seems to admit relations as entities. Heil and Auriol and right.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism

21958	Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
	Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
	From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter

16589	Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol]
	Full Idea: Prime matter has no essence, nor a nature that is determinate, distinct, and actual. Instead, it is pure potential, and determinable, so that it is indeterminately and indistinctly a material thing.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], II.12.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
	A reaction: Pasnau thinks Auriol has the best shot at explaining the vague idea of 'prime matter', with the thought that it exists, but indeterminateness is what gives it a lesser mode of existence. It strikes me as best to treat 'exist' as univocal.

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions

16651	God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol]
	Full Idea: If someone says 'God could make straightness without a line, and roughness and lightness in weight without parts', …then show me the reason why God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, yet cannot do these things.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], IV.12.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 11.4
	A reaction: How engagingly bonkers. The key idea preceding this is that God can do all sorts of things that are beyond our understanding. He is then obliged to offer some examples.