Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude' and 'Tonk, Plonk and Plink'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

21959	Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
	Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
	From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
	A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism

21958	Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
	Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
	From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation

17897	Analytic explanation is wholes in terms of parts; synthetic is parts in terms of wholes or contexts [Belnap]
	Full Idea: Throughout the whole texture of philosophy we distinguish two modes of explanation: the analytic mode, which tends to explain wholes in terms of parts, and the synthetic mode, which explains parts in terms of the wholes or contexts in which they occur.
	From: Nuel D. Belnap (Tonk, Plonk and Plink [1962], p.132)
	A reaction: The analytic would be bottom-up, and the synthetic would be top-down. I'm inclined to combine them, and say explanation begins with a model, which can then be sliced in either direction, though the bottom looks more interesting.

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement

7535	If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing [Monk]
	Full Idea: Whether the words 'belief' and 'judgement' mean the same thing is a moot point. Traditionally, a judgement is the assent of mind to a proposition. If one thinks that all beliefs are propositional, then beliefs and judgements are the same thing.
	From: Ray Monk (Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude [1996], Ch.19 n6)
	A reaction: If I think I have put a bit too much toothpaste on my brush, that strikes me as a non-propositional judgement, even though it could be spelled out as a proposition. But it also strikes me as a belief.