18 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
| 10794 | The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: The nominalist finds that standard semantics shackles him to first-order languages if, as nominalists are wont, he is to make do without abstract higher order objects. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.166) | |
| A reaction: Aha! Since I am pursuing a generally nominalist strategy in metaphysics, I suddenly see that I must adopt a hostile attitude to higher-order logic! Maybe plural quantification is the way to go, with just first-order objects. |
| 10786 | Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: The tendency has been to call any expression a 'name', however distant from the grammatical category of nouns, provided it is seen as referring. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.162) |
| 10788 | Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: For a nominalist with an ontology of empirically distinguishable objects, proper names are seen as a primary vehicle of reference. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.162) |
| 10799 | Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: For the nominalist, at level zero, where substituends are referring names, the quantifiers may be read existentially. Beyond level zero, the variables and quantifiers are read sustitutionally (though it is unclear whether this program is feasible). | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.167) |
| 10790 | Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: An adequate language for referring to infinitely many objects would seem to require variables and quantifiers in addition to names. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.164) |
| 10791 | Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: On a substitutional semantics of a first-order language, a domain of objects is not specified. Variables do not range over objects. They are place markers for substituends (..and sentences are true-for-all-names, or true-for-at-least-one-name). | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.165) |
| 10785 | Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: It has been suggested that a substitutional semantics for quantification theory lends itself to nominalistic aims. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.161) |
| 10795 | Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Translation into a substitutional language does not force the ontology. It remains, literally, and until the case for reference can be made, a façon de parler. That is the way the nominalist would like to keep it. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.166) |
| 10798 | A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Critics say if there are nondenumerably many objects, then on the substitutional view there might be true universal sentences falsified by an unnamed object, and there must always be some such, for names are denumerable. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.167) | |
| A reaction: [See Quine 'Reply to Prof. Marcus' p.183] The problem seems to be that there would be names which are theoretically denumerable, but not nameable, and hence not available for substitution. Marcus rejects this, citing compactness. |
| 10787 | Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Being itself has been viewed as referent of the verb 'to be'. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.162) |
| 10789 | Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists have the major task of explaining how predicates work. They usually construct it as a relation between individuals, or deny the referential function of predicates. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.163) |
| 10796 | If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.166) | |
| A reaction: Personally I don't think that would be the end of the world, but Fregeans go into paroxyms at the mention of 'psychology', because they fear that it destroys objectivity. That may be because they haven't understood thought properly. |
| 10797 | Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Substitutivity 'salve veritate' cannot define identity since two expressions may be everywhere intersubstitutable and not refer at all. | |
| From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.167) |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
| 23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
| Full Idea: Egalitarians believe that most often it is by promoting equality that autonomy is increased; this is the egalitarianism of such liberals as Ronald Dworkin. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 05.1 | |
| A reaction: Not my idea of equality. The whole point is to ascribe reasonable equality to everyone, including those with a limited capacity for autonomy. Equality is a consequence of universal respect. |
| 23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2 | |
| A reaction: The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal? |
| 18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Dworkin suggests that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality - in the more abstract and fundamental sense of treating people 'as equals'. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977], 179-83) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) | |
| A reaction: I associate this idea with Kant (who says they are equal by virtue of their rationality), so that's a pretty influential idea. I would associate the main challenge to this with Nietzsche. |