Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Aesthetics' and 'works'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'.
     From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1
     A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics presupposes a distinctive sort of experience, and a unified essence for art [Gardner]
     Full Idea: Aesthetics traditionally has two presuppositions: the first is that there is a distinctive form of experience which is common to the appreciation of art and natural beauty; the second is that art has an essence or some sort of underlying unity.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], Intro)
     A reaction: Both must come up for discussion. I think the biggest problem for the first one is the place of sexual attraction, or even fancying a prawn sandwich. The second has been weakened by Marcel Duchamp's urinal, and modern fringe arts.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
Art works originate in the artist's mind, and appreciation is re-creating this mental object [Gardner]
     Full Idea: A strong tradition in aesthetics (the 'idealist' view) regards works of art as existing originally in the artist's mind, and the appreciation of art as a matter of re-creating the artist's mental object.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 2.2)
     A reaction: He mentions Collingwood and Croce. Against this is the view (Idea 7268) that what goes on in the artist's mind is just irrelevant. Freud is important here, suggesting that the artist doesn't quite know what he or she is doing.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Aesthetic objectivists must explain pleasure being essential, but not in the object [Gardner]
     Full Idea: The aesthetic objectivist faces the difficulty of accounting for the fact that pleasure is not in the object, and is necessary for, and not just a contingent accompaniment to, aesthetic response.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.2.3)
     A reaction: The objectivist has to claim, not utterly implausibly, that if you don't get pleasure from certain works, then you 'ought' to. You can ignore a good work, but to deny that it gives pleasure is a failing in you.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Aesthetic judgements necessarily require first-hand experience, unlike moral judgements [Gardner]
     Full Idea: I am not within my rights to declare an object beautiful until I have seen it myself, ..unlike moral judgement, which (arguably) does not presuppose either a felt response or personal acquaintance.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.1)
     A reaction: Particularists might argue that moral judgements also require exposure to the actual situation, if they are to be authentic and authoritative. We can also discuss principles of aesthetics in the absence of examples.