Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Works of Love' and 'Morality and the emotions'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
21959 Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21958 Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
24008 Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The reference to a man's emotions has a significance for our understanding of his moral sincerity, not as a substitute for or addition to how he acts, but as, on occasion, underlying our understanding of how he acts.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.223)
     A reaction: Williams aims to rescue emotion from the emotivists, and replace it at the centre of traditional modes of moral judgement. I suppose we could assess one rogue robot as behaving 'badly' in a community of robots.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
24009 Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If moral education does not revolve around what to fear, to be angry about, to despise, and where to draw the line between kindness and a stupid sentimentality - I do not know what it is. (Though there are principles, of truth-telling and justice).
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225)
     A reaction: He cites Aristotle as the obvious source of this correct idea. The examples of principle both require us to place a high value on truth and justice, and not just follow rules in the style of arithmetic.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
24007 Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Emotivism held that there were two purposes of moral judgements: to express the emotions of the speaker, and to influence the emotions of his hearers.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.209)
     A reaction: I take Ayer to be typical of the first project, and Hare of the second. The theory is much more plausible when the second aim is added. Would we ever utter a moral opinion if we didn't hope to influence someone?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
15998 Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: To love another in spite of his weaknesses and errors and imperfections is not perfect love. No, to love is to find him lovable in spite of, and together with, his weaknesses and errors and imperfections.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Works of Love [1847], p.158)
     A reaction: A true romantic at heart, Kierkegaard ideally posits perfect love as unconditional love, and not just of good attributes, predicates and conditions. However, the real question for both me and Kierkegaard is, is perfect love desirable or even possible?[SY]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
24010 An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: One's conception of an admirable human being implies that he should be disposed to certain kinds of emotional response, and not to others.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225)
     A reaction: So are the good emotions an indicator of being a good person, or is that what their goodness consists of? The goodness must be cashed out in actions, and presumably good emotions both promise good actions, and motivate them.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
24012 Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: There is a certain moral woodenness or even insolence in Kant's blank regard for consistency. It smacks of Keynes's Principle of Unfairness - that if you can't do a good turn to everybody, you shouldn't do it to anybody.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.226)
     A reaction: He says it also turns each of us into a Supreme Legislator, which deifies man. It is clearly not the case that morality consists entirely of rules and principles, but Williams recognises their role, in truth-telling for example.