4 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
| 6457 | Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey] |
| Full Idea: Whereas a sensation is by definition mental, a sense-datum might be mind-independent. | |
| From: Godfrey Vesey (Collins Dictionary of Philosophy [1990], p.266) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be what Russell is getting at in 1912, as he clearly separates sense-data from sensations. Discussions of sense-data always assume they are mental, which may make them redundant - but so might making them physical. |
| 1490 | You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: One would have to be very morally lazy to be unconcerned with the possibility that the prevailing morality of one's culture had something fundamentally wrong with it. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (MacIntyre versus the Enlightenment [1988], 203) |