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9757
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A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
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Full Idea:
In forming a particular plan of life, you need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even now. When the person is viewed as an agent, no clear content can be given to the idea of a merely present self.
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From:
Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §2)
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A reaction:
I certainly like the notion that we should treat persons primarily as agents, since I take personhood to be more like a process than an existent entity. If a large brick is about to hit you, you actually have no future, though you think you have.
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20400
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Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
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Full Idea:
Wimsatt and Beardsley claimed that either the intention succeeded, so one does not need to look outside the work for its meaning, or the intention failed, so external evidence does not help.
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From:
report of W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 5.3
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A reaction:
Actually, the external evidence may tell you much more clearly and accurately what the intention was than the work itself does. The best example may be the title of the work, which is presumably outside the work.
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7268
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The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
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Full Idea:
We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.
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From:
W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
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A reaction:
Wrong. If in Browning's "My Last Duchess" (say), we only inferred the mind of the speaker (and his Duchess), and took no interest in Browning's view of things, we would miss the point. We might end up respecting the Duke, which would be daft.
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7271
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Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
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Full Idea:
The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.
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From:
W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §IV)
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A reaction:
I am very keen to penetrate the author's intentions, but I have always be doubtful about the use of biography as a means to achieve this. Most of the effort to infer intentions must come from a study of the work itself, not introductions, letters etc.
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9760
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Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
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Full Idea:
For utilitarians, self-concern causes needless pain; for Kantians, it evinces a lack of respect for one's own humanity; for the religious moralist, it is a failure of responsibility for what has been placed in one's special care.
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From:
Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5)
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A reaction:
Worryingly, given my heathenish views, I find the third one the most congenial. If we don't take responsibility for our own selves (e.g. for having a great talent), then no one (even parents) will take responsibility for anything.
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9761
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Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
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Full Idea:
The personal concern which begins with one's life in a particular body finds its place in ever-widening spheres of agency and enterprise, developing finally into a personal concern for the impersonal.
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From:
Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5)
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A reaction:
I am very struck by this nice thought, which comes from a very committed Kantian. It seems to me to capture the modern orthodoxy in ethical thinking - that concern for one's self, rather than altruism, is central, but altruism should follow from it.
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