19 ideas
| 21406 | Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Considered objectively, there can only be one human reason, there cannot be many philosophies; in other words, there can only be one true philosophy from principles, in however many conflicting ways men have philosophised about the same proposition. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Pref) | |
| A reaction: An idea that embodies the Enlightenment ideal. I like the idea that there is one true philosophy, because there is only one world. Kant is talking of philosophy 'from principles', which means his transendental idealism. |
| 14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
| Full Idea: Essentialism is not verified by the observation that numbers have interesting essential properties, since they are properties of classes and so are entities of a higher logical type than individuals. | |
| From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This relies on a particular view of number (which might be challenged), but is interesting when it comes to abstract entities having essences. Only ur-elements in set theory could have essences, it seems. Why? Rising in type destroys essence? |
| 14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
| Full Idea: Essentialism says some individuals have certain 'interesting' necessary properties. If it exists, it has that property. The properties are 'interesting' as had in virtue of their own peculiar natures, rather than as general necessary truths. | |
| From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], Intro) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This is a modern commentator caught between two views. The idea that essence is the non-trivial-necessary properties is standard, but adding their 'peculiar natures' connects him to Aristotle, and Kit Fine's later papers. Good! |
| 14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
| Full Idea: There is a tendency to think of essential properties as having some characteristic in addition to their necessity, such as intrinsicality. | |
| From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], VIII) | |
| A reaction: Personally I am inclined to take this view of all properties, and not just the 'essential' ones. General necessities, relations, categorisations, disjunctions etc. should not be called 'properties', even if they are 'predicates'. Huge confusion results. |
| 14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
| Full Idea: Essentialism entails the existence of necessary singular propositions that are not instances of necessary generalizations. Therefore, since there are no such propositions, essentialism is false. | |
| From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], I) | |
| A reaction: This summarises the attack which McMichael wishes to deal with. I am wickedly tempted to say that essences actually have a contingent existence (or a merely hypothetical dependent necessity), and this objection might be grist for my mill. |
| 21081 | We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Reason has taken care that the understanding is as fully equipped as possible with a priori intuitions for the construction of the concept of right. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Intro E) | |
| A reaction: A priori intuitions are not the same as innate knowledge or innate concepts, but they must require some sort of inbuilt inner resources. Further evidence that Kant is a rationalist philosopher (if we were unsure). |
| 7667 | There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius. | |
| From: report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism | |
| A reaction: This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny. |
| 21082 | A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The state of nature need not be a state of injustice merely because those who live in it treat one another in terms of power. But it is devoid of justice, for if a dispute over right occurs in it, there is no competent judge to give valid decisions. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §44) | |
| A reaction: Could you not achieve justice by means of personal violence? Might not a revered older person have been accepted as a judge? |
| 21089 | Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A monarch has the highest power, while an autocrat or absolute ruler is one who has all the power. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §51) | |
| A reaction: If society is strictly hierarchical (like an army) then the monarch also has all the power. At the other extreme the one holding the highest power may have very little power, because so many others have their share of the power. |
| 21086 | Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A hereditary nobility is a distinction bestowed before it is earned, and since it gives no ground for hoping that it will be earned, it is wholly unreal and fanciful. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen D) | |
| A reaction: As the controller of the region of a country, a hereditary noble is the embodiment of a ruling family, which is a well established way of running things. Daft, perhaps, but there are probably worse ways of doing it. Single combat, for example. |
| 21080 | Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Intro C) | |
| A reaction: This idea shows the moral basis for Kant's liberalism in politics. If all individuals acted without contact or reference to other individuals (a race of hermits) then that would appear to be optimum moral right, by this standard. |
| 21083 | Women have no role in politics [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Women in general …have no civil personality. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §46) | |
| A reaction: In case you were wondering. This is five years after Mary Wollstonecraft's book. |
| 21407 | Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Our innate equality is independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Div B) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem to capture the whole concept. The two of us may be unequally oppressed by a third. We are unequal with the third, but also with one another, though with no binding relationships. |
| 21084 | In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant] |
| Full Idea: By the original contract all members of the people give up their external freedom in order to receive it back at once as members of a commonweath. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §47) | |
| A reaction: This tries to give the impression that absolutely nothing is lost in the original alienation of rights. It is probably better to say that you give up one set of freedoms, which are replaced by a different (and presumably superior) set. |
| 21090 | If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Whatever someone has himself substantially made is his own undisputed property. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §55) | |
| A reaction: To this extent Kant offers clear agreement with Locke about a self-evident property right. Ownership of land is the controversial bit. |
| 21087 | Human life is pointless without justice [Kant] |
| Full Idea: If justice perishes, there is no further point in men living on earth. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen E) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that human life is also pointless if it only involves justice, and nothing else worthwhile. Are there other things so good that we might sacrifice justice to achieve them? How about maximal utilitarian happiness? |
| 21088 | Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant] |
| Full Idea: All murderers …must suffer the death penalty. This is what justice, as the idea of judicial power, wills in accordance with universal laws of a priori origin. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen E) | |
| A reaction: Illustration of how giving a principle an a priori origin puts it beyond dispute. Kant is adamant that mercy mustn't interfere with the enactment of justice. And Kant obviously rejects any consequentialist approach. Remind me what is wrong with murder? |
| 21085 | The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The church [as opposed to religion] fulfils a genuine political necessity, for it enables the people to regard themselves as subjects of an invisible supreme power to which they must pay homage. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen C) | |
| A reaction: I'm sure I remember Marx putting a different spin on this point… This idea captures the conservative attitude to established religion, at least in the UK. |
| 14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
| Full Idea: Individuals appear to enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations. | |
| From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], VIII) | |
| A reaction: This is a very significant chicken-or-egg issue. The remark seems to offer the vision of pre-existing general laws, which individuals then join (like joining a club). But surely the laws are derived from the individuals? Where else could they come from? |