43 ideas
10365 | We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Mellor offers a distinction between 'facts' and 'facta' (the latter being the truth-makers for facts). | |
From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1 | |
A reaction: The idea is that 'facta' can do the work in causation, because 'facts' are not part of the world. This seems a very helpful terminology, which should be encouraged, since 'fact' is plainly ambiguous in current usage. |
8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: Sentential logic has been proved consistent and complete; its consistency means that no contradictions can be derived, and its completeness assures us that every one of the logical truths can be proved. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: The situation for quantificational logic is not quite so clear (Orenstein p.98). I do not presume that being consistent and complete makes it necessarily better as a tool in the real world. |
8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: In axiomatizing, we are merely sorting out among the truths of a science those which will play a special role, namely, serve as axioms from which we derive the others. The sentences are already true in a non-conventional or ordinary sense. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: If you were starting from scratch, as Euclidean geometers may have felt they were doing, you might want to decide which are the simplest truths. Axiomatizing an established system is a more advanced activity. |
8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: The five systems of propositional modal logic contain successively stronger conceptions of necessity. In S4 'it is poss that it is poss that p' implies 'it is poss that p'. In S5, 'it is poss that it is nec that p' implies 'it is nec that p'. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: C.I. Lewis originated this stuff. Any serious student of modality is probably going to have to pick a system. E.g. Nathan Salmon says that the correct modal logic is even weaker than S4. |
8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: The incompleteness of set theory contrasts sharply with the completeness of elementary logic. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to be Quine's reason for abandoning the Frege-Russell logicist programme (quite apart from the problems raised by Gödel. |
8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: The theory of mereology has had a history of being exploited by nominalists to achieve some of the effects of set theory. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Some writers refer to mereology as a 'theory', and others as an area of study. This appears to be an interesting line of investigation. Orenstein says Quine and Goodman showed its limitations. |
8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: In traditional logic from Aristotle to Kant, universal sentences have existential import, but Brentano and Boole construed them as universal conditionals (such as 'for anything, if it is a man, then it is mortal'). | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I am sympathetic to the idea that even the 'existential' quantifier should be treated as conditional, or fictional. Modern Christians may well routinely quantify over angels, without actually being committed to them. |
8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: The substitution view of quantification explains 'there-is-an-x-such-that x is a man' as true when it has a true substitution instance, as in the case of 'Socrates is a man', so the quantifier can be read as 'it is sometimes true that'. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: The word 'true' crops up twice here. The alternative (existential-referential) view cites objects, so the substitution view is a more linguistic approach. |
8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: The 'natural' numbers are the whole numbers 1, 2, 3 and so on. The 'rational' numbers consist of the natural numbers plus the fractions. The 'real' numbers include the others, plus numbers such a pi and root-2, which cannot be expressed as fractions. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The 'irrational' numbers involved entities such as root-minus-1. Philosophical discussions in ontology tend to focus on the existence of the real numbers. |
8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: The question to be posed is whether is-a-member-of should be considered a logical constant, that is, does logic include set theory. Frege, Russell and Whitehead held that it did. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is obviously the key element in the logicist programme. The objection seems to be that while first-order logic is consistent and complete, set theory is not at all like that, and so is part of a different world. |
19482 | Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Our best theories of physics imply we shouldn't be here. The big bang ought to have produced equal amounts of matter and antimatter particles, which would have almost immediately annihilated each other, leaving nothing but light. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.05.23) | |
A reaction: This is not, of course, a rejection of physics, but a puzzle about the current standard model of physics. |
19483 | CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The phenomenon of charge-parity (CP) violation says that under certain circumstances antiparticles decay at different rates from their matter counterpart. ...This might explain matter's dominance in the universe, but the effect is too small. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.05.23) | |
A reaction: Physicists are currently studying CP violations, hoping to explain why there is any matter in the universe. This will not, I presume, explain why matter and antimatter arrived in the first place. |
8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: Modest ontologies are Nominalism (Goodman), admitting only concrete individuals; and Extensionalism (Quine/Davidson) which admits individuals and sets; but Intensionalists (Frege/Carnap/Church/Marcus/Kripke) may have propositions, properties, concepts. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I don't like sets, because of Idea 7035. Even the ontology of individuals could collapse dramatically (see the ideas of Merricks, e.g. 6124). The intensional items may be real enough, but needn't have a place at the ontological high table. |
19737 | A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: If we can train a system for prediction, it can essentially infer the structure of the world it's looking at by doing this prediction. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.12.12) | |
A reaction: [AI expert] This seems to be powerful support for the centrality of mathematical laws of nature in achieving understanding of the world. We may downplay the 'mere' ability to predict, but this idea says that the rewards of prediction are very great. |
8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: The principle of conservatism in choosing between theories is a maxim of minimal mutilation, stating that of competing theories, all other things being equal, choose the one that violates the fewest background beliefs held. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: In this sense, all rational people should be conservatives. The idea is a modern variant of Hume's objection to miracles (Idea 2227). A Kuhnian 'paradigm shift' is the dramatic moment when this principle no longer seems appropriate. |
19736 | Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Early neural nets were really good at recognising general categories, such as a car or a chair. Those networks are good at extracting the 'chair-ness' or the 'car-ness' of the object. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.12.12) | |
A reaction: [Interview with Yann LeCun, Facebook AI director] Fregean philosophers such as Geach think that extracting features is a ridiculous idea, but if even a machine can do it then I suspect that human beings can (and do) manage it too. |
16419 | No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The financial sector has been clamouring for a rationality test for years. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) | |
A reaction: Many aspects of intelligence tests do actually pick out what I would call rationality (which includes 'rational intuition', a new favourite of mine). But they are mixed in with rather mechanical geeky sort of tests. |
16417 | About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Possibly a third of the variation in our intelligence is down to the environment in which we grew up - nutrition and education, for example. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) | |
A reaction: This presumably leaves the other two-thirds to derive from genetics. I am a big believer in environment. Swapping babies between extremes of cultural environment would hugely affect intelligence, say I. |
16418 | People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: You really can be highly intelligent, and at the same time very stupid. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) | |
A reaction: This is closely related to my observation (from a lifetime of study) that a talent for philosophy has a very limited correlation with standard notions of high intelligence. What matters is how conscious reasoning and intuition relate. Greek 'phronesis'. |
19484 | Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Psychologists have long thought that measuring on a scale of just five personality dimensions - agreeableness, extroversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness and openness to new experiences - can capture all human variations in behaviour and attitude. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.06.13) | |
A reaction: Researchers are considering a sixth - called 'honesty-humility' - which is roughly how devious people are. The five mentioned here seem to be a well entrenched orthodoxy among professional psychologists. Is personality more superficial than character? |
8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: A good part of the confidence people have that there are meanings rests on the confusion of meaning and reference. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: An important point. Everyone assumes that sentences link to the world, but Frege shows that that is not part of meaning. Words like prepositions and conjunctions ('to', 'and') don't have 'a meaning' apart from their function and use. |
8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: 'Socrates is human' is true if 1) subject referent is identical with a predicate referent (Nominalism), 2) subject reference member of the predicate set, or the subject has that property (Platonism), 3) predicate set a member of the subject set (Montague) | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Orenstein offers these as alternatives to Quine's 'inscrutability of reference' thesis, which makes the sense unanalysable. |
8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |
Full Idea: If we can say 'there exists a p such that John believes p and Barbara believes p', logical forms such as this are cited as evidence for our ontological commitment to propositions. | |
From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Opponents of propositions (such as Quine) will, of course, attempt to revise the logical form to eliminate the quantification over propositions. See Orenstein's outline on p.171. |
4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Mellor argues that causal statements relate facts, where facts may be seen as whatever true propositions express. | |
From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6 | |
A reaction: Choose between 'facts', 'objects', 'conserved quantities, 'events' (the usual one) or 'processes'. I rather like processes (Salmon) as they are a better prospect as the building blocks of an ontology. |
8408 | Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley] |
Full Idea: The basic idea of probabilistic causation is that a sufficient condition of C's being a cause of E is that C and E are actual, individual events, and the objective chance of E's occurring is greater given the occurrence of C than it would be without C. | |
From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.3 | |
A reaction: Mellor has to include objective 'chances' in his ontology to support his theory. As it stands this looks like a weak theory, since the event might not occur despite C happening, and some less likely event might turn out to be the actual cause. |
19950 | Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: All our physical laws are time-symmetric, ...so things can run forwards or backwards. But entropy is an exception, saying that disorder increases over time. Many physicists therefore suspect that the flow of time is linked to entropy. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) |
19478 | Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: A light ray always moves at one unit of space per unit of time - a constant diagonal on the graph. ...But the direction that light rays travel in is neither space nor time, and is called 'null'. It is on the edge between space and time. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: Don't understand this, but it sounds fun. |
19474 | Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: When we measure the evolution of a quantum state, it is to the beat of an external timepiece of unknown provenance. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: It is best not to leap to philosophical conclusions when studying modern physics. Evidently time has a very different status in quantum mechanics and in relativity theory. |
19473 | The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: A quantum object's state is described by a wave function living in Hilbert space, encompassing all of its possible states. We see how the wave function evolves in time, moving from one state to another, using the Schrödinger equation. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: [These idea are basic explanations for non-scientific philosophers - please forgive anything that makes you wince] |
19953 | In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory suggests that space-time has a grainy substructure - you can't keep chopping it indefinitely into smaller and smaller pieces. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) | |
A reaction: Presumably the proposal is that strings are the true 'atoms'. |
19476 | String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions to be mathematically consistent. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: Apparently because of 'Ads/CFT', it may be possible to swap this situation for a more tractable 4-dimensional version. |
19954 | It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory has more than 10-to-the-500th solutions, each describing a different sort of universe, so it is nigh-on impossible to find the one solution that corresponds to our geometrically flat, expanding space-time full of particles. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) |
19947 | Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The elements of the abstract mathematical entity called Hilbert Space represent all the possible states of a quantum system | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 1017.02.04) |
19948 | Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Our hunt for the most basic ingredients of reality has left us muddled about the status of time. One culprit for this was Einstein, whose theory of general relativity merged time with space. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) |
19955 | Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: A promising theory (based on the 'Maldacena duality' - that string equations for gravity are the same as quantum equations for surface area) is that space-time is really just geometrical manifestations of quantum entanglement. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) | |
A reaction: This is a speculation which might unite the incompatible quantum and general relativity theories. |
19475 | Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Relativity says space and time are on the same footing - together they are the fabric of reality. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, treats time and space differently, with time occasionally seeming more fundamental. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: Interesting. When talking about time, people glibly cite relativistic space-time to tell you that time is just another dimension. Now I can reply 'Aaah, but what about time in quantum mechanics? Eh? Eh?'. Excellent. |
19949 | Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: After general relativity, quantum mechanics reinstated our familiar notion of time. The buzzing of the quantum world plays out according to the authoritative tick of a clock outside the described system, ...but where is this clock doing its ticking? | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) |
19951 | Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Smolin observes that if entropy increases, the early universe must have been highly ordered, which we cannot explain. Maybe we need to build time directionality into the laws, instead of making time depend on entropy. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
19477 | General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Black holes are predicted by general relativity, and are thought to exist where massive stars once lived, as well as at the heart of every galaxy. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: Since black holes now seem to be a certainty, that is one hell of an impressive prediction. |
19952 | Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Black holes have a temperature, and hence entropy. ...But if a black hole are just an extreme scrunching of smooth space-time, it should have no substructure, and thus no entropy. This is probably the most obvious incompleteness of general relativity. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) |
16420 | 84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Dark matter makes up 84.5 percent of the universe's matter. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) |
17604 | We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Ei-ichi Negishi (Nobel chemist of 2010) says 'the ultimate goal is to be able to synthesise any molecule we want. We are probably about halfway there'. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2010.10.16) |
17603 | Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Ei-ichi Negishi (Nobel chemist of 2010) says 'I work with the periodic table in front of me at all times, and approach all challenges in terms of three particles, positively charged protons, negatively charged electrons, and neutral neutrinos'. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2010.10.16) |