Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Aesthetica', 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory' and 'Quaestiones de anima'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is in large part concerned with ...what science could get along with, could be reconstructed by means of, as distinct from what science has historically made us of.
     From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], V)
     A reaction: This nicely summarises the programme for the whole of the philosophy of David Lewis, who was Quine's pupil. If you start by asking what it could 'get by with', it is not surprising that simplicity is the top intellectual virtue for both of them.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine]
     Full Idea: The logician does not even need to paraphrase the vernacular into his logical notation, for he has learned to think directly in his logical notation, or even (which is the beauty of the thing) to let it think for him.
     From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], V)
     A reaction: See Williamson's love of logic (and his book on modal metaphysics). This idea embodies the dream of hardcore Frege-Russellian analytic philosophers. I wish someone had told me when I studied logic that the target was to actually think symbolically.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine]
     Full Idea: The power and simplicity of an algorithm, or indeed of any theory, depend on there being many occurrences of few elements rather than few occurrences of many.
     From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], III)
     A reaction: Not sure how this applies to a software function. One which produces a good result from a large number of input variables sounds particularly impressive to me. Many occurrences of a single variable sounds rather inefficient.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine]
     Full Idea: The logician drops 'if-then' in favour of '→' without ever entertaining the mistaken idea that they are synonymous.
     From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], V)
     A reaction: [Quine uses the older horseshoe symbol] The conditional in English is not well understood, whereas the symbol is unambiguous. A warning to myself, since I have a tendency to translate symbols into English all the time. [p.156 'implies' is worse!]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine]
     Full Idea: It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of recognising the timelessness of quantification over temporal entities.
     From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], IV)
     A reaction: 'Some moments in this cricket match were crucial'. The domain is not timeless, but consists of moments in this match. Can you say the quantifier is timeless but its domain is not? Only in the sense that 'very' is a timeless word, I think.
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
     Full Idea: A logical language is not independent of ordinary language. It has its roots in ordinary language, and these roots are not to be severed.
     From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], V)
     A reaction: Music to my ears. When you study logic, no one has to teach you what the words 'or' and 'if-then' mean, but they are disambiguated by the symbolism. The roots of logic are in ordinary talk of 'and', 'or' and 'not', which is the real world.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine]
     Full Idea: Ordinary language is reduced to logical form in two ways: reduction of the variety of idioms and grammatical constructions, and reduction of each surviving idiom to one fixed and convenient interpretation.
     From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], V)
     A reaction: Is there a conflict between a 'fixed' and a 'convenient' result? By 'fixed' I suppose he means it is a commitment (to not waver). What is the logical form of a sentence which is deliberately ambiguous?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: One thing simpliciter is produced out of many actually existing things only if there is something uniting and tying them to each other. If Socrates were animal and rational by different forms, then to be united they would need something to make them one.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de anima [1269], 11c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.2
     A reaction: This is the reply to the idea that a single thing is just an interesting of many sortal essences. It presumes, of course, that a thing like a horse has something called 'unity'.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
     Full Idea: Ordinarily the conditional is not thought of as true or false at all, but rather the consequent is thought of as conditionally true or false given the antecedent.
     From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], III)
     A reaction: At first this seems obvious, but a conditional asserts a relationship between two propositions, and so presumably it is true if that relationship exists. 'Is it actually true that if it is Monday then everyone in the office is depressed?'.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
     Full Idea: We understand under what circumstances to say of any given statement that it is true, just as clearly as we understand the statement itself.
     From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], II)
     A reaction: This probably shouldn't be taken as a theory of meaning (in which Quine doesn't really believe) but as a plausible statement of correlated facts. Hypothetical assertions might be a problem case. 'If only I could be in two places at once'?
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Baumgarten founded aesthetics in 1750 [Baumgarten, by Tolstoy]
     Full Idea: Baumgarten founded aesthetics in the year 1750.
     From: report of Alexander Baumgarten (Aesthetica [1739]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.2
     A reaction: He gave it a label, separated it off from the rest of philosophy, and made taste the main focus. The philosophy of art goes back to at least Plato's 'Republic' and 'Symposium'.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
Beauty is an order between parts, and in relation to the whole [Baumgarten, by Tolstoy]
     Full Idea: Beauty is defined by Baumgarten as a correspondence, that is, an order of parts in their mutual relations to each other and in their relation to the whole.
     From: report of Alexander Baumgarten (Aesthetica [1739]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.3
     A reaction: This may be one aspect of what is beautiful, but rather more than a nice arrangement is probably needed for art. We must distinguish flower arranging from poetic drama. Some masterpieces are rather messily arranged.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Perfection comes through the senses (Beauty), through reason (Truth), and through moral will (Good) [Baumgarten, by Tolstoy]
     Full Idea: For Baumgarten, Beauty is the Perfect (the Absolute), recognised through the senses; Truth is the Perfect perceived through reason; Goodness is the Perfect reached by moral will.
     From: report of Alexander Baumgarten (Aesthetica [1739]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.3
     A reaction: At last, after many years of searching, I have found the origin of that great trio of ideals: Beauty, Goodness and Truth. Tolstoy sneers at them, but a person could do a lot worse than spending their lives trying to promote them.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider]
     Full Idea: Quine's view is that time is 'space-like'. Past objects are as real as present ones; they're just temporally distant, just as spatially distant objects are just as real as the ones around here.
     From: report of Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953]) by Theodore Sider - Logic for Philosophy 7.3.1
     A reaction: Something is a wrong with a view that says that a long-dead person is just as real as one currently living. Death is rather more than travelling to a distant place. Arthur Prior responded to Quine by saying 'tense operators' are inescapable.