Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable' and 'Model Theory for Modal Logic I'

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24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense.
     From: Kit Fine (Model Theory for Modal Logic I [1978], 151), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics
     A reaction: I have no view on this, but I am prejudiced in favour of the idea that there is a correct logic for such things, whichever one it may be. Presumably the fact that S5 has no restrictions on accessibility makes it more comprehensive and 'metaphysical'.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg]
     Full Idea: For a set to be 'well-ordered' it is required that every subset of the set has a first element.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg]
     Full Idea: Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13)
Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg]
     Full Idea: The idea of the 'power set' means that it is always possible to generate a bigger one using only the elements of that set, namely the set of all its subsets.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.14)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg]
     Full Idea: Axiom of Extension: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg]
     Full Idea: Axiom of Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong. So you can make a set out of two other sets.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / d. Axiom of Unions III
Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg]
     Full Idea: Axiom of Unions: For every collection of sets there exists a set that contains all the elements that belong to at least one of the sets in the collection.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg]
     Full Idea: Axiom of Infinity: There exists a set containing the empty set and the successor of each of its elements.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15)
     A reaction: This is rather different from the other axioms because it contains the notion of 'successor', though that can be generated by an ordering procedure.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg]
     Full Idea: Axiom of Powers: For each set there exists a collection of sets that contains amongst its elements all the subsets of the given set.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15)
     A reaction: Obviously this must include the whole of the base set (i.e. not just 'proper' subsets), otherwise the new set would just be a duplicate of the base set.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg]
     Full Idea: Axiom of Choice: For every set we can provide a mechanism for choosing one member of any non-empty subset of the set.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15)
     A reaction: This axiom is unusual because it makes the bold claim that such a 'mechanism' can always be found. Cohen showed that this axiom is separate. The tricky bit is choosing from an infinite subset.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / k. Axiom of Existence
Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg]
     Full Idea: Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set. This may be the empty set, but you need to start with something.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg]
     Full Idea: Axiom of Specification: For every set and every condition, there corresponds a set whose elements are exactly the same as those elements of the original set for which the condition is true. So the concept 'number is even' produces a set from the integers.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15)
     A reaction: What if the condition won't apply to the set? 'Number is even' presumably won't produce a set if it is applied to a set of non-numbers.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg]
     Full Idea: Three views of mathematics: 'pure' mathematics, where it doesn't matter if it could ever have any application; 'real' mathematics, where every concept must be physically grounded; and 'applied' mathematics, using the non-real if the results are real.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.17)
     A reaction: Very helpful. No one can deny the activities of 'pure' mathematics, but I think it is undeniable that the origins of the subject are 'real' (rather than platonic). We do economics by pretending there are concepts like the 'average family'.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg]
     Full Idea: You can think of an ordinal number as being defined by the set that comes before it, so, in the non-negative integers, ordinal 5 is defined as {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13)
Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg]
     Full Idea: With ordinary finite numbers ordinals and cardinals are in effect the same, but beyond infinity it is possible for two sets to have the same cardinality but different ordinals.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg]
     Full Idea: The 'transcendental numbers' are those irrationals that can't be fitted to a suitable finite equation, of which π is far and away the best known.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch. 6)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / k. Imaginary numbers
By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg]
     Full Idea: The realisation that brought 'i' into the toolkit of physicists and engineers was that you could extend the 'number line' into a new dimension, with an imaginary number axis at right angles to it. ...We now have a 'number plane'.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.12)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg]
     Full Idea: It is a chicken-and-egg problem, whether the lack of zero forced forced classical mathematicians to rely mostly on a geometric approach to mathematics, or the geometric approach made 0 a meaningless concept, but the two remain strongly tied together.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch. 6)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg]
     Full Idea: As far as Kronecker was concerned, Cantor had built a whole structure on the irrational numbers, and so that structure had no foundation at all.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg]
     Full Idea: Paul Cohen showed that the Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15)
The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg]
     Full Idea: The 'continuum hypothesis' says that aleph-one is the cardinality of the rational and irrational numbers.
     From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.14)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii)
     A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking).
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi)
     A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding.