Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori' and 'Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic

9358	There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The fact is that there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms and such that whoever, using it, avoids false premises, will never reach a false conclusion.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.366)
	A reaction: As the man who invented modal logic in five different versions, he speaks with some authority. Logicians now debate which version is the best, so how could that be decided? You could avoid false conclusions by never reasoning at all.

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle

9357	Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its negative. It declares our purpose to make a complete dichotomy of experience, ..which is only our penchant for simplicity.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.365)
	A reaction: I find this view quite appealing. 'Look, it's either F or it isn't!' is a dogmatic attitude which irritates a lot of people, and appears to be dispensible. Intuitionists in mathematics dispense with the principle, and vagueness threatens it.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

9364	Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: A name must represent some uniformity in experience or it names nothing.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368)
	A reaction: I like this because, in the quintessentially linguistic debate about the exact logical role of names, it reminds us that names arise because of the way reality is; they are not sui generis private games for logicians.

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms

17945	Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
	Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible.
	From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii)

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking

17946	Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
	Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming.
	From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii)
	A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking).

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

9362	Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: Those laws and those laws only have necessary truth which we are prepared to maintain, no matter what.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367)
	A reaction: This bold and simple claim has famously been torpedoed by a well-known counterexample - that virtually every human being will cling on to the proposition "dogs have at some time existed" no matter what, but it clearly isn't a necessary truth.

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding

17944	'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
	Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding.
	From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi)
	A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention

9365	We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The a priori contains principles which can be maintained in the face of all experience, representing the initiative of the mind. But they are subject to alteration on pragmatic grounds, if expanding experience shows their intellectual infelicity.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.373)
	A reaction: [compressed] This simply IS Quine's famous 'web of belief' picture, showing how firmly Quine is in the pragmatist tradition. Lewis treats a priori principles as a pragmatic toolkit, which can be refined to be more effective. Not implausible...

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection

9361	We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: Physical processes present us with phenomena in which the purely mathematical has to be separated out by abstraction.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367)
	A reaction: This is the father of modal logic endorsing traditional abstractionism, it seems. He is also, though, endorsing the view that a priori knowledge is created by us, with pragmatic ends in view.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

9363	Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The scientific search is for such classification as will make it possible to correlate appearance and behaviour, to discover law, to penetrate to the "essential nature" of things in order that behaviour may become predictable.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368)
	A reaction: Modern scientific essentialists no longer invoke scare quotes, and I think we should talk of the search for the 'mechanisms' which explain behaviour, but Lewis seems to have been sixty years ahead of his time.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws

17993	Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain [Vetter]
	Full Idea: The laws of a domain are the fundamental, general explanatory relationships between kinds, quantities, and qualities of that domain, that supervene upon the essential natures of those things.
	From: Barbara Vetter (Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature [2012], 9.3)
	A reaction: Hm. How small can the domain be? Can it embrace the multiverse? Supervenience is a rather weak relationship. How about 'are necessitated/entailed by'? Are the relationships supposed to do the explaining? I would have thought the natures did that.