Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'Frege's Theory of Numbers' and 'Resemblance Nominalism: a solution to universals'

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5 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17447 Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
     Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
     From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
     A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
17945 Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
17946 Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii)
     A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking).
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
18436 Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
     Full Idea: A and B are the sole truthmakers for 'A and B resemble each other'. There is no need to postulate extra entities - the resembling entities suffice to account for them. There is no regress of resemblances, ...since there are no resemblances at all.
     From: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Resemblance Nominalism: a solution to universals [2002], p.115), quoted by Douglas Edwards - Properties 5.5.2
     A reaction: This seems to flatly reject the ordinary conversational move of asking in what 'respect' the two things resemble, which may be a genuine puzzle which gets an illuminating answer. We can't fully explain resemblance, but we can do better than this!
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
17944 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi)
     A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding.