11 ideas
| 3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52) |
| 17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible. | |
| From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii) |
| 17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming. | |
| From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii) | |
| A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking). |
| 17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding. | |
| From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi) | |
| A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding. |
| 1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) | |
| A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential. |
| 1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) |
| 3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11) |
| 3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23) |
| 17897 | Analytic explanation is wholes in terms of parts; synthetic is parts in terms of wholes or contexts [Belnap] |
| Full Idea: Throughout the whole texture of philosophy we distinguish two modes of explanation: the analytic mode, which tends to explain wholes in terms of parts, and the synthetic mode, which explains parts in terms of the wholes or contexts in which they occur. | |
| From: Nuel D. Belnap (Tonk, Plonk and Plink [1962], p.132) | |
| A reaction: The analytic would be bottom-up, and the synthetic would be top-down. I'm inclined to combine them, and say explanation begins with a model, which can then be sliced in either direction, though the bottom looks more interesting. |
| 1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28) | |
| A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus. |
| 1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3) |