10 ideas
6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Reason is our power of finding out true propositions. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very good definition. I don't see how you can define reason without mentioning truth, and you can't believe in reason if you don't believe in truth. The concept of reason entails the concept of a good reason. |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii) |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii) | |
A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking). |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi) | |
A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding. |
23224 | That all matter thinks is absurd, and would make each part of our bodies a distinct self-consciousness [Bentley] |
Full Idea: [Belief in thinking matter] leads to monstrous absurdities. …Every stock and stone would be a percipient and rational creature. …every single Atom of our bodies would be a distinct Animal, endued with self-consciousness and personal sensation of its own. | |
From: Richard Bentley (Matter and Motion Cannot Think [1692], p.14-15), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 2 | |
A reaction: Sounds correct, though presumably panpsychists don't think the flickers of consciousness in my toenails and hair constitute full-blown persons. I can't imagine what awareness is being claimed for my toenails. |
6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Can there not be a right and wrong state of our moral sense, as there is in our other senses? | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV) | |
A reaction: Hutcheson replies by saying something like they are both fully reliable in normal conditions. It remains, though, a very good question for the intuitionist to face, as the moral sense is supposed to be direct and reliable, but how do you check? |
6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: In the following discourse, happiness denotes pleasant sensation of any kind, or continued state of such sensations. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is a very long way from Greek eudaimonia. Hutcheson seems to imply that I would be happy if I got high on drugs after my family had just burnt to death. Socrates points out that scratching an itch is a very pleasant sensation (Idea 132). |
6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: What rule of actions can be formed, without relation to some end proposed? Or what end can be proposed, without presupposing instincts, desires, affections, or a moral sense, it will not be easy to explain. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV) | |
A reaction: We have no reason to think that 'instincts, desires and affections' will give us the remotest guidance on how to behave morally well (though we would expect them to aid our survival). How could a moral sense give a reason, without spotting a rule? |
6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: The reasons assigned for actions are such as 'It is the end proposed by the Deity'. But why do we approve concurring with the divine ends? The reason is given 'He is our benefactor', but then, for what reason do we approve concurrence with a benefactor? | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
A reaction: Characteristic of what MacIntyre calls the 'Enlightenment Project', which is the application of Cartesian scepticism to proving the foundations of morals. Proof beyond proof is continually demanded. If you could meet God, you would obey without question. |
6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Why may not the Deity have something of a superior kind, analogous to our moral sense, essential to him? | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I) | |
A reaction: This is Plato's notion of the gods, as beings who are profoundly wise, and understand all the great moral truths, but are not the actual originators of those truths. The idea that God creates morality actually serves to undermine morality. |