Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'Conversations, with Glyn Daly' and 'Frege'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


9 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
Kant was the first philosopher [Zizek]
     Full Idea: From today's perspective it is in a way clear that Kant was the first philosopher. Pre-Kantian philosophy cannot think in his transcendental aspect.
     From: Slavoj Zizek (Conversations, with Glyn Daly [2004], §1)
     A reaction: It is probably equally plausible to say that Kant was the last philosopher. More thought-provoking than true.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
There is no dialogue in philosophy [Zizek]
     Full Idea: I think I truly became a philosopher when I realised that there is no dialogue in philosophy. Plato's dialogues are clearly fakes, with one guy talking most of the time. ...Philosophy as an interdisciplinary project is the ultimate nightmare.
     From: Slavoj Zizek (Conversations, with Glyn Daly [2004], §1)
     A reaction: This goes against all my prejudices in favour of teamwork and mutual criticism (e.g. Idea 1576), but I was a bit shaken by it, and have begun to wonder whether I must just face up to the solitary nature of the enterprise.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy is transcendental questioning (not supporting science or constructing ontology) [Zizek]
     Full Idea: Philosophy can no longer play its traditional roles, giving foundations to science, or constructing general ontology. It should simply fulfil its task of transcendental questioning.
     From: Slavoj Zizek (Conversations, with Glyn Daly [2004], §2)
     A reaction: I remain unsure what is being recommended, unless it is for philosophy to start asking questions just at the point where everyone else gives up.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Aristotelian logic dealt with inferences about concepts, and there were also proposition inferences [Weiner]
     Full Idea: Till the nineteenth century, it was a common view that Aristotelian logic could evaluate inferences whose validity was based on relations between concepts, while propositional logic could evaluate inferences based on relations between propositions.
     From: Joan Weiner (Frege [1999], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Venn diagrams relate closely to Aristotelian syllogisms, as each concept is represented by a circle, and shows relations between sets. Arrows seem needed to represent how to go from one proposition to another. Is one static, the other dynamic?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii)
     A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking).
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi)
     A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Consciousness is a malfunction of evolution [Zizek]
     Full Idea: Consciousness is a kind of mistake, a malfunction of evolution, and out of this mistake a miracle occurred.
     From: Slavoj Zizek (Conversations, with Glyn Daly [2004], §2)
     A reaction: Rather hard to prove, but actually quite an uplifting thought. If consciousness only evolved so that we could navigate and defend ourselves, our 'higher' activities seem irrelevant. But Zizek's view means we can make them central. Nice.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Tolerance and love are strategies to avoid encountering our neighbours [Zizek]
     Full Idea: All this preaching about tolerance, love for one's neighbour and so on, are ultimately strategies to avoid encountering the neighbour.
     From: Slavoj Zizek (Conversations, with Glyn Daly [2004], §2)
     A reaction: I have begun to wonder whether some such motivation underlies the modern obsession with raising huge sums for charity.