Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity'', 'The Pragmatist Account of Truth' and 'The Case against Closure (and reply)'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James]
     Full Idea: After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates or remits….) is his interest in consistency, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions.
     From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Seventh')
     A reaction: People notoriously contradict themselves all the time, but I suspect that it is when they get out of their depth in complexities such as politics. They probably achieve great consistency within their own expertise, and in common knowledge.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James]
     Full Idea: Realities are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them.
     From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
     A reaction: At last, a remark by James about truth which I really like. For 'realities' I would use the word 'facts'.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii)
     A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking).
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi)
     A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
     Full Idea: Closure is the epistemological principle that if S knows that P is true and knows that P implies Q, then, evidentially speaking, this is enough for S to know that Q is true. Nothing more is needed.
     From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.25)
     A reaction: [Dretske was the first to raise this issue] It is 'closure' because it applies to every case of Q, which is every implication of P that is known. The issue is whether we really do know all such Qs. Dretske doubts it. See his zebra case.
We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
     Full Idea: One doesn't have to regret everything one knows to be implied by what one regrets. Tom regrets drinking three martinis, but doesn't regret what he knows to be implied by this - that he drank 'something', or that the past is real.
     From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.28)
     A reaction: A nice case of analogy! He's right about regret. Perceptual and inferential knowledge have different grounds. To deny inferential knowledge seems to be a denial that modus ponens can be a justification. But MP gives truth, not knowledge.
Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
     Full Idea: Some reasons for believing P do not transmit to things, Q, known to be implied by P.
     From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.29)
     A reaction: That seems true enough. I see someone limping, but infer that their leg is damaged. The only question is whether I should accept the inference. How can I accept that inference, but then back out of that knowledge?
Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
     Full Idea: A way of knowing there are cookies in the jar - visual perception - is not a way of knowing what one knows to be implied by this - that visual appearances are not misleading.
     From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.29)
     A reaction: Why is the 'way of knowing' relevant? Isn't the only question that of whether implication of a truth is in infallible route to a truth (modus ponens)? If you know THAT it is true, then you must believe it, and implication is top quality justification. No?
The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
     Full Idea: The only way to preserve knowledge of homely truths, the truths everyone takes themselves to know, is to abandon closure.
     From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.32)
     A reaction: His point is that knowledge of homely truths seems to imply knowledge of the background facts needed to support them, which he takes to be an unreasonable requirement. I recommend pursuing contextualism, rather than abandoning closure.
P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
     Full Idea: The evidence that gives me knowledge of P (there are cookies in the jar) can exist without evidence for knowing Q (they are not fake), despite my knowing that P implies Q. So closure fails.
     From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.33)
     A reaction: His more famous example is the zebra. How can P imply Q if there is no evidence for Q? Maybe 'there are cookies in the jar' does not entail they are not fake, once you disambiguate what is being said?
We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
     Full Idea: The reality of the past (a 'heavyweight implication') ...is something we know to be implied by things we remember, but it is not itself something we remember.
     From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.35)
     A reaction: If I begin to doubt that the past is real, then I must necessarily begin to doubt my ordinary memories. This seems to be the modus tollens of knowledge closure. Doesn't that imply that the modus ponens was valid, and closure is correct?
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]
     Full Idea: We find satisfaction in consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock previously acquired truths.
     From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
     A reaction: I like this, apart from the idea that the criterion of good coherence seems to be subjective 'satisfaction'. We should ask why some large set of beliefs is coherent. I assume nature is coherent, and truth is the best explanation of our coherence about it.