42 ideas
16241 | The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics, insofar as it is concerned with the natural world, can do no better than to reflect on physics. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: I suppose so. Physics only works at one level of description. Metaphysics often works with concepts which only emerge at a more general level than physics. There are also many metaphysical problems which are of no interest to most physicists. |
16257 | Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: The Kantian strain survives in the notion that metaphysics is not about the world, but about our 'conceptual system', especially as what structures our thought about the world. This keeps it a priori, and so not about the world itself. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3) | |
A reaction: Strawson would embody this view, I suppose. I take our conceptual system to be largely a reflection of (and even creation of) the world, and not just an arbitrary conventional attempt to grasp the world. Analysing concepts partly analyses the world. |
16276 | Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: If metaphysical possibility extends more widely than physical possibility, this may make metaphysics out to be nothing but the analysis of fantastical descriptions produced by philosophers. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue) | |
A reaction: Maudlin wants metaphysics to be firmly constrained in its possibilities by what scientific undestanding permits, and he is right. Metaphysics must integrate into science, or wither away on the margins. |
16244 | If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: If the universe has been profligate, then Ockham's Razor will lead us astray. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: That is, there may be a vast number of entities which exist beyond what seems to be 'necessary'. |
16255 | The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: The Razor is good when it councils higher credence to explanations which posit a single cause to multiple events that occur in a striking pattern, over explanations involving coincidental multiple causes. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5) | |
A reaction: This is in the context of Maudlin warning against embracing the Razor too strongly. Presumably inductive success suggests that the world supports this particular use of the Razor. |
13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Statements of the form '"it is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' and '"the world war will begin in 1963" is true if and only if the world war will being in 1963' can be regarded as partial definitions of the concept of truth. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.404) | |
A reaction: The key word here is 'partial'. Truth is defined, presumably, when every such translation from the object language has been articulated, which is presumably impossible, given the infinity of concatenated phrases possible in a sentence. |
10196 | The Axiom of Choice needs a criterion of choice [Black] |
Full Idea: Some mathematicians seem to think that talk of an Axiom of Choice allows them to choose a single member of a collection when there is no criterion of choice. | |
From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.68) |
13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
Full Idea: For a language, we must enumerate the primitive terms, and the rules of definition for new terms. Then we must distinguish the sentences, and separate out the axioms from amng them, and finally add rules of inference. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.402) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This lays down the standard modern procedure for defining a logical language. Once all of this is in place, we then add a semantics and we are in business. Natural deduction tries to do without the axioms. |
13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Semantics is the totality of considerations concerning concepts which express connections between expressions of a language and objects and states of affairs referred to by these expressions. Examples are denotation, satisfaction, definition and truth. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.401) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, he notes that it 'is not commonly recognised' that truth is part of semantics. Nowadays truth seems to be the central concept in most semantics. |
13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
Full Idea: People have not been aware that the language about which we speak need by no means coincide with the language in which we speak. ..But the language which contains its own semantics must inevitably be inconsistent. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.402) | |
A reaction: It seems that Tarski was driven to propose the metalanguage approach mainly by the Liar Paradox. |
13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Here is a partial definition of the concept of satisfaction: John and Peter satisfy the sentential function 'X and Y are brothers' if and only if John and Peter are brothers. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.405) | |
A reaction: Satisfaction applies to open sentences and truth to closed sentences (with named objects). He uses the notion of total satisfaction to define truth. The example is a partial definition, not just an illustration. |
13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
Full Idea: It has been found useful in defining semantical concepts to deal first with the concept of satisfaction; both because the definition of this concept presents relatively few difficulties, and because the other semantical concepts are easily reduced to it. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.406) | |
A reaction: See Idea 13339 for his explanation of satisfaction. We just say that a open sentence is 'acceptable' or 'assertible' (or even 'true') when particular values are assigned to the variables. Then sentence is then 'satisfied'. |
13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
Full Idea: Using the definition of truth we are in a position to carry out the proof of consistency for deductive theories in which only (materially) true sentences are (formally) provable. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Establishment of Scientific Semantics [1936], p.407) | |
A reaction: This is evidently what Tarski saw as the most important first fruit of his new semantic theory of truth. |
16243 | The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: The Humean project is unjustified, in that both the laws of nature and the direction of time require no analysis, and is misconceived, in that the atoms it employs do not correspond to present physical ontology. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: I certainly find it strange, or excessively empirical, that Lewis thinks our account of reality should rest on 'qualities'. Maudlin's whole books is an implicit attack on David Lewis. |
16271 | Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: At base it is not merely, as Lewis says, that everything else supervenes on the Mosaic; but rather that anything that exists at all is just a feature or element or generic property of the Mosaic. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6) | |
A reaction: [Maudlin has just quoted Idea 16210] Correct about Lewis, but Lewis just has a normal view of supervenience. Only 'emergentists' would think the supervenience allowed anything more, and they are deeply misguided, and in need of help. |
16273 | If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: The Humean Mosaic appears to admit of no further explanation. Since it is the ontological bedrock, …none of the further things can account for the structure of the Mosaic itself. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6) | |
A reaction: A very nice point, reminiscent of Popper's objection to essentialism, that he thought it blocked further enquiry, when actually further enquiry was possible. Lewis and Hume seem too mesmerised by epistemology. They need best explanation. |
16275 | The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: The 'spinning disc' is not metaphysically possible. We have every reason to believe that there is no such thing as 'perfectly homogeneous matter'. The atomic theory of matter is as well established as any scientific theory is likely to be. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue) | |
A reaction: This is a key case for Maudlin, and his contempt for metaphysics which is not scientifically informed. I agree with him. Extreme thought experiments are worth considering, but impossible ones are pointless. |
16258 | To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of ontological commitment becomes a central element in a theory of ontology if one merely adds that a particular theory is, in fact, true | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Helpful. I don't think the truth of a theory entails the actual existence of every component mentioned in the theory, as some of them may be generalisations, abstractions, vague, or even convenient linking fictions. |
16259 | Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: Naïve translation from natural language into formal language can obscure necessary ontology as easily as it can create superfluous ontological commitment. …The lion's share of metaphysical work is done when settling on the right translation. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: I suspect this is more than a mere problem of 'naivety', but may be endemic to the whole enterprise. If you hammer a square peg into a round hole, you expect to lose something. Language is subtle, logic is crude. |
16253 | A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: Fragility is not a fundamental physical property, in that two pieces of glass cannot be physically identical save for their fragility. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5) | |
A reaction: Nice. The best idea I have found in Maudlin, so far! This gives a very nice test for picking out the fundamental physical and intrinsic properties. |
16263 | Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: If one believes that fundamental physics is the place to look for the truths about universals (or tropes or natural sets), then one may find that physics is telling us there are no such things. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.2) | |
A reaction: His prior discussion of quantum chromodynamics suggests, to me, merely that properties can be described in terms of vectors etc., and remains neutral on the ontology - but then I am blinded by science. |
16260 | Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: On one line of thought, the question of whether universals exist seems to reduce to the question of the utility, or necessity, of using second-order rather than first-order logic. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Second-order logic quantifies over properties, where first-order logic just quantifies over objects. This is an extreme example of doing your metaphysics largely through logic. Not my approach. |
10194 | Two things can only be distinguished by a distinct property or a distinct relation [Black] |
Full Idea: The only way we can discover that two things exist is by finding out that one has a quality not possessed by the other, or else that one has a relational characteristic that the other hasn't. | |
From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.67) | |
A reaction: At least this doesn't conflate relations with properties. Note that this idea is clearly epistemological, and in no way rules out the separateness of two objects which none of us can ever discern. Maybe the Earth has two Suns, which imperceptibly swap. |
10193 | The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black] |
Full Idea: Saying that 'a has the property of being identical with a' is a roundabout way of saying nothing - a useless tautology - and means not more than 'a is a' | |
From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.66) | |
A reaction: This matter resembles the problem of the number zero, and the empty set, which seem to be crucial entities for logicians, but of no interest to a common sense view of the world. So much the worse for logic, I am inclined to say. |
10195 | If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black] |
Full Idea: Isn't it logically possible that the universe should have contained nothing but two exactly similar spheres? ...So two things would have all their properties in common, and this would refute the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. | |
From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.67) | |
A reaction: [Black is the originator of this famous example] It also appears to be naturally possible. An observer at an instant of viewing will discern a relational difference relative to themselves. Most people take Black's objection to be decisive. |
16277 | Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: While logical impossibility is a species of metaphysical impossibility, logical possibility is not a species of metaphysical possibility. The logically impeccable description 'Cicero was not Tully' describes a metaphysically impossible situation. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue) | |
A reaction: The context of this is Maudlin attack on daft notions of metaphysical possibility that are at variance with the limits set by science, but he is still conceding that there are types of metaphysical modality. |
16249 | A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: The purpose of the antecedent of a counterfactual is to provide instructions on how to pick a Cauchy surface (pick a moment in time) and how to generate an altered description of that moment. It is more of a command than an indicative sentence. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Quite plausible, but the antecedent might contain no description. 'If things had gone differently, we wouldn't be in this mess'. The antecedent might be timeless. 'If pigs had wings, they still wouldn't fly'. |
16254 | Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: Induction is always a leap beyond the known, but we are constantly assured by later experience that we have landed safely. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5) | |
A reaction: Not philosophically very interesting, but a nice remark for capturing the lived aspect of inductive thought, as practised by the humblest of animals. |
16245 | Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: A law ought to be capable of playing some role in explaining the phenomena that are governed by or are manifestations of it. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.2) | |
A reaction: I find this attitude bewildering. 'Why do electrons have spin?' 'Because they all do!' The word 'governed' is the clue. What on earth is a law, if it can 'govern' nature? What is its ontological status? Natures of things are basic, not 'laws'. |
16248 | Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: The evaluation of counterfactual claims is widely recognised as being influenced by context and interest. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Such evaluation certainly seems to involve imagination, and so the pragmatics can creep in there. I don't quite see why it should be deeply contextual. |
16250 | We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: It seems unlikely the psychological process could mirror Lewis's semantics: people don't imagine a multiplicity of worlds and the pick out the most similar. Rather we construct representations of possible worlds from counterfactual descriptions. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5) | |
A reaction: I approve of fitting such theories into a psychology, but this may be unfair to Lewis, who aims for a logical model, not an account of how we actually approach the problem. |
16268 | The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: A counterexample to the counterfactual approach is that perhaps the effect would have occurred despite the absence of the cause since another cause would have stepped in to bring it about. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5) | |
A reaction: …Hence you cannot say 'if C had not occurred, E would definitely not have occurred'. You have to add 'ceteris paribus', which ruins the neatness of the theory. |
16267 | If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: When we think we know the cause of an event, we typically assent to the corresponding Hume counterfactual. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5) | |
A reaction: This is the correct grounding of the counterfactual approach - not that we think counterfactuals are causation, but that knowledge of causation will map neatly onto a network of counterfactuals, thus providing a logic for the whole process. |
16269 | If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: If Kennedy had still been President in Dec 1963, he would not have been assassinated in Nov 1963, so the counterfactual goes both ways (where the cause seems to only go one way). | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5) | |
A reaction: Maudlin says a lot of fine-tuning has sort of addressed these problems, but that counterfactual causation is basically wrong-headed anyway, and I incline to agree, though one must understand what the theory is (and is not) trying to do. |
16247 | Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: Laws are ontologically primitives at least in that two worlds could differ in their laws but not in any observable respect. ….[21] I take content of the laws to be expressed by equations. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.4) | |
A reaction: At least that spells out his view fairly dramatically, but I am baffled as to what he thinks a law could be. He is arguing against the Lewis regularity-axioms view, and the Armstrong universal-relations view. He ignores the essentialist view. |
16272 | Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: The fundamental laws of nature appear to be laws of temporal evolution: they specify how the state of the universe will, or might, evolve from a given intial state. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6) | |
A reaction: Maudlin takes both laws of nature and the passage of time to be primitive facts, and this is how they are connected. I think (this week) that I take time and causation to be primitive, but not laws. |
16242 | Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: The laws of nature stand in no need of 'philosophical analysis'; they ought to be posited as ontological bedrock. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is Maudlin's most basic principle, and I don't agree with it. The notion that laws are more deeply embedded in reality than the physical stuff they control is a sort of 'law-mysticism' that needs to be challenged. |
16251 | 'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: 'All humans who live in houses with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law because the class referred to is not a natural kind. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.6) | |
A reaction: Maudlin wants laws to be primitive, but he now needs a primitive notion of a natural kind to make it work. If kinds generate laws, you can ditch the laws, and build your theory on the kinds. He also says no death is explained by 'all humans are mortal'. |
16270 | If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: On the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, I take it that if the world is extensive and variegated enough, then there must be laws. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5.2) | |
A reaction: A nice point. If there is any sort of pattern discernible in the surface waves on the sea, then there must be a law to cover it, not matter how vague or complex. |
16264 | I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: I believe that it is a fundamental, irreducible fact about the spatio-temporal structure of the world that time passes. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4) | |
A reaction: Worth quoting because it comes from a philosopher fully informed about, and heavily committed to, the physicist's approach to reality. One fears that physicists steeped in Einstein are all B-series Eternalists. Get a life! |
16265 | If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: It is necessary and, I suppose, a priori that if time passes at all it passes at one second per second. …Similarly, the fair exchange rate for a dollar must be a dollar. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4.1) | |
A reaction: [He is discussing Huw Price on time] This is a reply to the claim that if time passes it has to pass at some rate, and 'one second per second' is ridiculous. Not very convincing, even with the dollar analogy. |
16266 | There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin] |
Full Idea: Given events ordered in a B series, one defines an infinitude of different A series that correspond to taking different events as 'now' or 'present'. McTaggart talks of 'the A series' when there is an infinitude of such. | |
From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4.3 n11) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a rather mathematical (and distorted) claim about the A series view. The A-series is one dynamic happening. Not an infinity of static times lines, each focused on a different 'now'. |