7 ideas
| 21753 | If we look at the world rationally, the world assumes a rational aspect [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Whoever looks at the world rationally will find that it in turn assumes a rational aspect; the two exist in a reciprocal relationship. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History [1837], p.29), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01 | |
| A reaction: What happens when I look at irrationality rationally? |
| 21974 | The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel] |
| Full Idea: To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back; the two exist in reciprocal relationship. | |
| From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History [1837], Intro p.29), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.4 | |
| A reaction: This is a nice variation on the stoic idea that nature is essentially rational. If we are capable of rationality, then nature has made us that way. Romantics seem to prefer looking at nature less rationally, so what do they see in nature? |
| 18969 | How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Suppose I say that I have given up precisely three beliefs since lunch. An over-coarse individuation could reduce the number to two, and an over-fine one could raise it to four. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.144) | |
| A reaction: Obviously if you ask how many beliefs I hold, it would be crazy to give a precise answer. But if I search for my cat, I give up my belief that it is in the kitchen, in the lounge and in the bathroom. That's precise enough to be three beliefs, I think. |
| 7295 | Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A] |
| Full Idea: Maybe we should say that IF regularities are stable, only then is induction a reliable procedure. | |
| From: Alistair Mitchell (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me a very good proposal. In a wildly unpredictable reality, it is hard to see how anyone could learn from experience, or do any reasoning about the future. Natural stability is the axiom on which induction is built. |
| 18967 | A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine] |
| Full Idea: A 'proposition' is the meaning of a sentence. More precisely, since propositions are supposed to be true or false once and for all, it is the meaning of an eternal sentence. More precisely still, it is the 'cognitive' meaning, involving truth, not poetry. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.139) | |
| A reaction: Quine defines this in order to attack it. I equate a proposition with a thought, and take a sentence to be an attempt to express a proposition. I have no idea why they are supposed to be 'timeless'. Philosophers have some very odd ideas. |
| 18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
| Full Idea: The trouble with propositions, as cognitive meanings of eternal sentences, is individuation. Given two eternal sentences, themselves visibly different linguistically, it is not sufficiently clear under when to say that they mean the same proposition. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.140) | |
| A reaction: If a group of people agree that two sentences mean the same thing, which happens all the time, I don't see what gives Quine the right to have a philosophical moan about some dubious activity called 'individuation'. |
| 18970 | The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Unless we are prepared to believe that absolute position makes sense, the very idea of a point as an entity in its own right must be rejected as not merely mysterious but absurd. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.149) | |
| A reaction: The fact that without absolute position we can only think of 'points' as relative to a conceptual grid doesn't stop the grid from picking out actual locations in space, as shown by latitude and longitude. |