17 ideas
14519 | It is a great good to show reverence for a wise man [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: To show reverence for a wise man is itself a great good for him who reveres [the wise man]. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 32) | |
A reaction: It is characteristic of Epicurus to move up a level in his thinking, and not merely respect wisdom, but ask after the value of his own respect. Compare Idea 14517. Nice. |
14518 | In the study of philosophy, pleasure and knowledge arrive simultaneously [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: In philosophy the pleasure accompanies the knowledge. For the enjoyment does not come after the learning but the learning and the enjoyment are simultaneous. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 27) |
8983 | If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: Sets have sharp boundaries, or are sharp objects; an object either definitely belongs to a set, or it does not. But 'red' is vague; there objects which are neither definitely red nor definitely not red. Hence there is no set of red things. | |
From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §2) | |
A reaction: Presumably that will entail that there IS a set of things which can be described as 'definitely red'. If we describe something as 'definitely having a hint of red about it', will that put it in a set? In fact will the applicability of 'definitely' do? |
8986 | We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: We must reject the classical picture of classification by pigeon-holes, and think in other terms: classifying can be, and often is, clustering round paradigms. | |
From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §8) | |
A reaction: His conclusion to a discussion of the problem of vagueness, where it is identified with concepts which have no boundaries. Pigeon-holes are a nice exemplar of the Enlightenment desire to get everything right. I prefer Aristotle's categories, Idea 3311. |
14524 | Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Epicurus said that body was conceived as an aggregate of shape and size and resistance and weight. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.257] Note that this is how we 'conceive' them. They might be intrinsically different, except that Epicurus is pretty much a phenomenalist. |
8982 | Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: If a word is vague, there are or could be borderline cases, but non-vague expressions can also have borderline cases. The essence of vagueness is to be found in the idea vague concepts are concepts without boundaries. | |
From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], Intro) | |
A reaction: He goes on to say that vague concepts are not embodied in clear cut sets, which is what gives us our notion of a boundary. So what is vague is 'membership'. You are either a member of a club or not, but when do you join the 'middle-aged'? |
8984 | If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: Vague concepts are boundaryless, ...and the manifestations are an unwillingness to draw any such boundaries, the impossibility of identifying such boundaries, and needlessness and even disutility of such boundaries. | |
From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §5) | |
A reaction: People have a very fine-tuned notion of whether the sharp boundary of a concept is worth discussing. The interesting exception are legal people, who are often forced to find precision where everyone else hates it. Who deserves to inherit the big house? |
8985 | Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: Boundaryless concepts tend to come in systems of contraries: opposed pairs like child/adult, hot/cold, weak/strong, true/false, and complex systems of colour terms. ..Only a contrast with 'adult' will show what 'child' excludes. | |
From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §5) | |
A reaction: This might be expected. It all comes down to the sorites problem, of when one thing turns into something else. If it won't merge into another category, then presumably the isolated concept stays applicable (until reality terminates it? End of sheep..). |
7295 | Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A] |
Full Idea: Maybe we should say that IF regularities are stable, only then is induction a reliable procedure. | |
From: Alistair Mitchell (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a very good proposal. In a wildly unpredictable reality, it is hard to see how anyone could learn from experience, or do any reasoning about the future. Natural stability is the axiom on which induction is built. |
14521 | If everything is by necessity, then even denials of necessity are by necessity [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: He who claims that everything occurs by necessity has no complaint against him who claims that everything does not occur by necessity. For he makes the very claim in question by necessity. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 40) |
14522 | What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: One should bring this question to bear on all one's desires: what will happen to me if what is sought by desire is achieved, and what will happen if it is not? | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 71) | |
A reaction: Yet another example of Epicurus moving up a level in his thinking about ethical issues, as in Idea 14517 and Idea 14519. The mark of a true philosopher. This seems to be a key idea for wisdom - to think further ahead than merely what you desire. |
3563 | Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: It is not possible to live pleasantly without living intelligently and finely and justly, nor to live intelligently and finely and justly without living pleasantly. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 5), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.16 | |
A reaction: A person with all these virtues might still suffer from depression. And I don't see why having limited intelligence should stop someone from living pleasantly. Just be warm-hearted. |
3560 | Justice is merely a contract about not harming or being harmed [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: There is no such things as justice in itself; in people's relations with one another in any place and at any time it is a contract about not harming or being harmed. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 33), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 13.2 |
14517 | We value our own character, whatever it is, and we should respect the characters of others [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: We value our characters as our own personal possessions, whether they are good and envied by men or not. We must regard our neighbours' characters thus too, if they are respectable. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 15) | |
A reaction: I like this because it introduces a metaethical dimension to the whole problem of virtue. We should value our own character - so should we try to improve it? Should we improve so much as to become unrecognisable? |
14513 | Justice is a pledge of mutual protection [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, neither to harm one another nor to be harmed. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 31) | |
A reaction: Notice that justice is not just reciprocal usefulness, but a 'pledge' to that effect. This implies a metaethical value of trust and honesty in keeping the pledge. Is it better to live by the pledge, or to be always spontaneously useful? |
14515 | A law is not just if it is not useful in mutual associations [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If someone passes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in mutual associations, this no longer possesses the nature of justice. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 37) |
14520 | It is small-minded to find many good reasons for suicide [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: He is utterly small-minded for whom there are many plausible reasons for committing suicide. | |
From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 38) | |
A reaction: It is a pity that the insult of 'small-minded' has slipped out of philosophy. The Greeks use it all the time, and know exactly what it means. We all recognise small-mindedness, and it is a great (and subtle) vice. |