3 ideas
13120 | Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Chisholm, by Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Chisholm's Ontological Categories: ENTIA - {Contingent - [Individual - (Boundaries)(Substances)] [States - (Events)]} {Necessary - [States] [Non-States - (Attributes)(Substance)]} | |
From: report of Roderick Chisholm (A Realistic Theory of Categories [1996], p.3) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01 | |
A reaction: [I am attempting a textual representation of a tree diagram! The bracket-styles indicate the levels.] |
4577 | There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine] |
Full Idea: In principle I see no higher or more austere necessity than natural necessity; and in natural necessity, or our attribution of it, I see only Hume's regularities | |
From: Willard Quine (Necessary Truth [1963], p.76) | |
A reaction: Presumably this allows logical necessity as a 'lower' necessity, but denies 'metaphysical' necessity, in line with Hume and other tough empiricists. Personally I adore metaphysical necessities, but they are a bit hard to establish conclusively. |
7295 | Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A] |
Full Idea: Maybe we should say that IF regularities are stable, only then is induction a reliable procedure. | |
From: Alistair Mitchell (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a very good proposal. In a wildly unpredictable reality, it is hard to see how anyone could learn from experience, or do any reasoning about the future. Natural stability is the axiom on which induction is built. |