13 ideas
12693 | A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A body is defined as that which exists in space. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Confessio naturae contra atheistas [1669], A6.1.490), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1 | |
A reaction: A very early view. Leibniz notes that this tells you nothing about shape and motion. |
6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Strong internalism says only current conscious states can justify beliefs, but this has the problem of Stored Beliefs, that most of our beliefs are stored in memory, and one's conscious state includes nothing that justifies them. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §2) | |
A reaction: This point seems obviously correct, but one could still have a 'fairly strong' version, which required that you could always call into consciousness the justificiation for any belief that you happened to remember. |
6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Even weak internalism has the problem of Forgotten Evidence; the agent once had adequate evidence that she subsequently forgot; at the time of epistemic appraisal, she no longer has adequate evidence that is retrievable from memory. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §3) | |
A reaction: This is certainly a basic problem for any account of justification. It will rule out any strict requirement that there be actual mental states available to support a belief. Internalism may be pushed to include non-conscious parts of the mind. |
6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
Full Idea: The problem for internalists of Doxastic Decision Interval says internal justification must avoid mental change to preserve the justification status, but must also allow enough time to compute the formal relations between beliefs. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §4) | |
A reaction: The word 'compute' implies a rather odd model of assessing coherence, which seems instantaneous for most of us where everyday beliefs are concerned. In real mental life this does not strike me as a problem. |
6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
Full Idea: The problem of Concurrent Retrieval is a problem for internalism, notably coherentism, because an agent could ascertain coherence of her entire corpus only by concurrently retrieving all of her stored beliefs. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §3) | |
A reaction: Sounds neat, but not very convincing. Goldman is relying on scepticism about short-term memory, but all belief and knowledge will collapse if we go down that road. We couldn't do simple arithmetic if Goldman's point were right. |
6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Reliability involves truth, and truth (on the usual assumption) is external. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §6) | |
A reaction: As an argument for externalism this seems bogus. I am not sure that truth is either 'internal' or 'external'. How could the truth of 3+2=5 be external? Facts are mostly external, but I take truth to be a relation between internal and external. |
6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced by this, as a simple rule. If I spend my whole life doing just the minimum for my own survival, I don't see why I should have to justify that, and I don't see a state is obliged to justify it either. |
6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
Full Idea: My own view is that moral justification must be capable of motivating, but not in virtue of reliance on pre-moral motives. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This may well be the core and essence of Kantian moral theory. I'm inclined to think of it as 'Kant's dream', which is of ultra-rational beings who are driven by pure rationality as a motivator. People who fit this bill tend to be academics. |
6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
Full Idea: I do not favour the route taken by Hobbes's modern descendants, using game theory, since I believe the impersonal standpoint makes an essential contribution to individual motivation which must be addressed by any ethically acceptable theory. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The assumption of self-seeking at the core of game theory seems very bizarre, and leads to moral approval of free riders. Nagel offers the best response, which is the Kantian impersonal view. Nagel may be optimistic about motivation, though. |
6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
Full Idea: In pursuit of the kind of objectivity needed in the physical sciences, we abstract even from our humanity; but nothing further than abstraction from our identity (that is, who we are) enters into ethical theory. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The 'brief' summary of this boils down to a nice and interesting slogan. It epitomises the modern Kantian approach to ethics. But compare Idea 4122, from Bernard Williams. |
6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
Full Idea: It is implicit in the categorical imperative that I can will that everyone should adopt as a maxim only what everyone else can also will that everyone should adopt as a maxim. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is a nice move, because it shifts the theory away from a highly individualistic Cartesian view of morality towards the idea that morality is a community activity. |
6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
Full Idea: A legitimate system is one which reconciles the two universal principles of impartiality and reasonable partiality so that no one can object that his interests are not being accorded sufficient weight or that the demands on him are excessive. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems an appealing principle, and a nice attempt at stating the core of Kantian liberalism. It is obviously influenced by Scanlon's contractualist view, in the idea that 'no one can object', because everyone sees the justification. |
6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
Full Idea: As things are, democracy is the enemy of comprehensive equality, once the poor cease to be a majority. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: This is obvious once you think about it, but it is well worth saying, because it is tempting to think that we live in an 'equal' society, merely because we are equal in things such as voting rights and equality before the law. |