27 ideas
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
Full Idea: In everyday language it seems impossible to define the notion of truth or even to use this notion in a consistent manner and in agreement with the laws of logic. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (works [1936]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int III | |
A reaction: [1935] See Logic|Theory of Logic|Semantics of Logic for Tarski's approach to truth. |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Tarski preferred an explicit definition of truth to axioms. He says axioms have a rather accidental character, only a definition can guarantee the continued consistency of the system, and it keeps truth in harmony with physical science and physicalism. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 2 n2 | |
A reaction: Davidson's summary, gleaned from various sources in Tarski. A big challenge for modern axiom systems is to avoid inconsistency, which is extremely hard to do (given that set theory is not sure of having achieved it). |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
Full Idea: No objective grounds are known to me which permit us to draw a sharp boundary between the two groups of terms, the logical and the non-logical. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (works [1936]), quoted by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §3 | |
A reaction: Musgrave is pointing out that this is bad news if you want to 'reduce' something like arithmetic to logic. 'Logic' is a vague object. |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Tarski's 1936 definition of logical consequence is that in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true too (so that no model can make the conclusion false). | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by JC Beall / G Restall - Logical Consequence 3 | |
A reaction: So the general idea is that a logical consequence is distinguished by being unstoppable. Sounds good. But then we have monotonic and non-monotonic logics, which (I'm guessing) embody different notions of consequence. |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Tarski's definition of logical consequence (1936) is that in a fully interpreted formal language an argument is valid iff under any allowed interpretation of its nonlogical symbols, if the premises are true then so is the conclusion. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by Wilfrid Hodges - Model Theory 3 | |
A reaction: The idea that you can only make these claims 'under an interpretation' seems to have had a huge influence on later philosophical thinking. |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: Tarski found an elegant new axiom system for Euclidean geometry that improved Hilbert's earlier version - and he formulated it without the use of set-theoretical notions. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Ch.9 |
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: Under certain conditions a clay statue is identical with the piece of clay of which it is made, and if this is so then the identity is contingent. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], Intro) | |
A reaction: This initiated the modern debate about statues, and it is an attack on Kripke's claim that if two things are identical, then they are necessarily identical. Kripke seems right about Hesperus and Phosphorus, but not about the statue. |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: A 'piece' of clay is a portion of clay which comes into existence when all of its parts come to be stuck to each other, and cease to be stuck to any clay which is not a part of the portion. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], I) | |
A reaction: The sort of gormlessly elementary things that philosophers find themselves having to say, but this is a good basic assertion for a discussion of statue and clay, and I can't think of an objection to it. |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: The piece of clay and the statue are 'objects' - that is to say, they can be designated with proper names, and the logic we ordinarily use will still apply. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], I) | |
A reaction: An interesting indication of the way that 'object' is used in modern analytic philosophy, which may not be the way that it is used in ordinary English. The number 'seven', for example, seems to be an object by this criterion. |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: To ask meaningfully what that thing would be, we must designate it either as a statue or as a piece of clay. What that thing would be, apart from the way it is designated, is a question without meaning. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], III) | |
A reaction: He obviously has a powerful point, but to suggest that we can only investigate a mysterious object once we have designated it as something sounds daft. It would ruin the fun of archaeology. |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: Essentialism for a class of entities is that for one entity and a condition which it fulfills, the question of whether it necessarily fulfills the condition has a definite answer apart from the way the entity is specified. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], VII) | |
A reaction: Yet another definition of essentialism, but resting, as usual in modern discussions, entirely on the notion of necessity. Kit Fine's challenge is that if you investigate the source of the necessity, it turns out to be an essence. |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: Essentialism for the class of concrete things is false, since a statue necessarily fulfils a condition as 'Goliath', but only contingently fulfils it as 'lumpl'. On the other hand, essentialism for the class of individual concepts can be true. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], VII) | |
A reaction: This rests on his definition of essentialism in Idea 14076. He rests his essentialism about concepts on an account given by Carnap ('Meaning and Necessity' §41). The essence of a statue and the essence of a lump of clay do seem distinct. |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: A proper name like 'Goliath' denotes a thing in the actual world, and invokes a sortal with certain persistence criteria. Hence its origin makes a statue the statue that it is, and if statues in different worlds have the same beginning, they are the same. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], III) | |
A reaction: Too neat. There are vague, ambiguous and duplicated origins. Persistence criteria can shift during the existence of a thing (like a club which changes its own constitution). In replicated statues, what is the status of the mould? |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: The most prominent objection to contingent identity (as in the case of the statue and its clay) is that it violates Leibniz's Law. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], V) | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by a property. The trickiest one would be that the statue has (right now) a disposition to be worth a lot, but the clay doesn't. But I don't think that is really a property of the statue. Properties are a muddle. |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: For two things to be strictly identical, they must have all properties in common. That means, among other things, that they must start to exist at the same time and cease to exist at the same time. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], I) | |
A reaction: I don't accept that coming into existence at time t is a 'property' of a thing. Coincident objects give you the notion of 'existing as' something, which complicates the whole story. |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: As a general law of substitutivity of identicals, Leibniz's Law is false. It is a law about properties and relations, that if two things are identical, they have the same properties and relations. It only works in contexts which attribute those. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], V) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced about relations, which are not intrinsic properties. Under different descriptions, the relations to human minds might differ. |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: To say than x has a property in a possible world is simply to say that x would have had the property if that world had been actual. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
A reaction: Plantinga tries to defuse all the problems with identity across possible worlds, by hanging on to subjunctive verbs and modal modifiers. The point, though, was to explain these, or at least to try to give their logical form. |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: A possible world is just a maximal possible state of affairs. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that Plantinga includes the word 'possible' in his definition. Possibility defines the worlds, and so worlds cannot be used on their own to define possibility. |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: Identity across possible worlds makes sense only with respect to a sortal | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], IV) | |
A reaction: See Gibbard's other ideas from this paper. I fear that the sortal invoked is too uncertain and slippery to do any useful job, and I can't see any principled difficulty with naming something before you can think of a sortal for it. |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: If the Socrates of the actual world has snubnosedness but Socrates-in-W does not, this is surely inconsistent with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, a principle than which none sounder can be conceived. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
A reaction: However, we allow Socrates to differ over time while remaining the same Socrates, so some similar approach should apply here. In both cases we need some notion of what is essential to Socrates. But what unites aged 3 with aged 70? |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: We may say it makes no sense to say that Socrates exists at a world, if there is in principle no way of identifying him. ...But this is confused. To suppose Agnew was a precocious baby, we needn't be able to pick him from a gallery of babies. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
A reaction: This seems a good point, and yet we have a space-time line joining adult Agnew with baby Agnew, and no such causal link is available between persons in different possible worlds. What would be the criterion in each case? |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: The Theory of Worldbound Individuals contends that no object exists in more than one possible world; this implies the outrageous view that - taking properties in the broadest sense - no object could have lacked any property that it in fact has. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II) | |
A reaction: Leibniz is the best known exponent of this 'outrageous view', though Plantinga shows that Lewis may be seen in the same light, since only counterparts are found in possible worlds, not the real thing. The Theory does seem wrong. |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: It is meaningless to talk of the same concrete thing in different possible worlds, ...but it makes sense to speak of the same individual concept, which is just a function which assigns to each possible world in a set an individual in that world. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], VII) | |
A reaction: A lovely bold response to the problem of transworld identity, but one which needs investigation. It sounds very promising to me. 'Aristotle' is a cocept, not a name. There is no separate category of 'names'. Wow. (Attach dispositions to concepts?). |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: To use Kripke's semantics, one needs extensive intuitions that certain properties are essential and others accidental. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], X) | |
A reaction: As usual, we could substitute the word 'necessary' for 'essential' without changing his meaning. If we are always referring to 'our' Hubert Humphrey is speculations about him, then nearly all of his properties will be necessary ones. |
11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: While Socrates has no counterparts that lack self-identity, he does have counterparts that lack identity-with-Socrates. He alone has that - the property, that is, of being identical with the object that in fact instantiates Socrateity. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II) | |
A reaction: I am never persuaded by arguments which rest on such dubious pseudo-properties. Whether or not a counterpart of Socrates has any sort of identity with Socrates cannot be prejudged, as it would beg the question. |
11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
Full Idea: It makes no sense to say I could have been someone else, yet Counterpart Theory implies not merely that I could have been distinct from myself, but that I would have been distinct from myself had things gone differently in even the most miniscule detail. | |
From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II) | |
A reaction: A counterpart doesn't appear to be 'me being distinct from myself'. We have to combine counterparts over possible worlds with perdurance over time. I am a 'worm' of time-slices. Anything not in that worm is not strictly me. |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: The reference of a name in the actual world is fixed partly by invoking a set of persistence criteria which determine what thing it names. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], III) | |
A reaction: This is offered as a modification to Kripke, to deal with the statue and clay. I fear that the 'persistence criteria' may be too vague, and too subject to possible change after the origin, to do the job required. |