Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Actualism and Possible Worlds', '03: Book of Leviticus' and 'De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence)'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
13070 If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: Socrates has no definition if definitions by their nature must be in purely general terms, and if no purely general terms can succeed in uniquely singling out this signated matter.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], 23) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.1.2
     A reaction: There seem to be two models. That general terms actually individuate the matter of Socrates, or that they cross-reference to (so to speak) define Socrates 'by elimination', as the only individual that fits. But the latter is a poor definition.
11197 The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: What sorts things into their proper genus and species are the definitions that express what they are.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92)
     A reaction: This is straight from Aristotle, though Aristotle's view is a little more complex, I think. If the definitions 'express what they are', then definitions seem to specify the essence.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
14664 Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: A 'necessary being' is one that exists in every possible world; and only some objects - numbers, properties, pure sets, propositions, states of affairs, God - have this distinction.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 2)
     A reaction: This a very odd list, though it is fairly orthodox among philosophers trained in modern modal logic. At the very least it looks rather parochial to me.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
11195 If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: If being is what makes propositions true, then anything we can express in an affirmative proposition, however unreal, is said to be; so lacks and absences are, since we say that absences are opposed to presences, and blindness exists in an eye.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92)
     A reaction: See Idea 11194 for the alternative Aristotelian approach to being, according to categories. Do absences and lacks have real essences, or causal properties? The absence of the sentry may cause the loss of the city.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
11201 Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Incidental properties have an incomplete essence, and need to refer in their definitions to their subject, lying outside their own genus.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93)
     A reaction: These are 'incidental' properties, but it is a nice question whether properties have essences. Presumably they must have if they are universals, or platonic Forms. The notion of being 'strong' can be defined without specific examples.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
11205 If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: If (in the Platonic view) manyness was contained in humanness it could never be one as it is in Socrates, and if oneness was part of its definition then Socrates would be Plato and the nature couldn't be realised more than once.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.100)
     A reaction: I suppose the reply is that since we are trying to explain one-over-many, then this unusual combination of both manyness and oneness is precisely what distinguishes forms from other ideas.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13090 The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: In the view of Aquinas, while substantial form is the ultimate ground of identity and difference of angels, it is matter that provides a principle of diversity in the case of corporeal substances.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 5.2.3
     A reaction: This is at least as good a proposal as their apatial location. There is more chance of reidentifying matter than of precisely reidentifying a spatial location. Two indistinguishable spheres remain the classic problem case (of Max Black, Idea 10195)
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11202 It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: It is by having essence that things exist.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.94)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 11199, which gives a fuller picture. This idea seems to suggest essence as the cause of existence, which sounds wrong. Perhaps essence is a necessary condition of existence, but it is necessary that nothing indeterminate can exist?
14666 Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Socrates is a contingent being; his essence, however, is not. Properties, like propositions and possible worlds, are necessary beings. If Socrates had not existed, his essence would have been unexemplified, but not non-existent.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 4)
     A reaction: This is a distinctive Plantinga view, of which I can make little sense. I take it that Socrates used to have an essence. Being dead, the essence no longer exists, but when we talk about Socrates it is largely this essence to which we refer. OK?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11203 Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Specific essence differs from generic essence by being demarcated: individuals are demarcated within species by dimensionally defined material, but species within genus by a defining differentiation taken from the form.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.95)
     A reaction: It clearly won't be enough to define an individual just to define its material and its shape. The material might also be essential to the genus, as when defining fire. Probably not very helpful.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
11200 The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Form alone cannot be a composite substance's essence. For a thing's essence is expressed by its definition, and unless the definition of a physical substance included both form and material, the definition wouldn't differ from mathematical objects.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93)
     A reaction: This is the sort of thoroughly sensible remark that you only get from the greatest philosophers. Minor philosophers fall in love with things like forms, and then try to use them to explain everything.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11196 Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Since being as belonging to a category expresses the 'isness' of things, and belongs to all ten Aristotelian categories, essence must be something all the natures that sort different beings into genera and species have in common.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92)
     A reaction: I like this because it is the essence which does the sorting, not the sorting which defines the essence (which seems to me to be a deep and widespread confusion).
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11208 A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: A simple substance is its own essence.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103)
     A reaction: Aquinas takes complex substances to have their essences in various ways, but this thought is the basis of all essence. Presumably the Greek word 'ousia' names the key ingredient.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
14662 Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: The idea of possible worlds has delivered insights on logical possibility (de dicto and de re), propositions, properties and sets, counterfactuals, time and temporal relations, causal determinism, the ontological argument, and the problem of evil.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], Intro)
     A reaction: This date (1976) seems to be the high-water mark for enthusiasm about possible worlds. I suppose if we just stick to 'insights' rather than 'answers' then the big claim might still be acceptable. Which problems are created by possible worlds?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16472 Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Plantinga's critics worry that the metaphysics is actualist in name only, since it is achieved only by populating the actual world with entities whose nature is explained in terms of merely possible things that would exemplify them if anything did.
     From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: Plantinga seems a long way from the usual motivation for actualism, which is probably sceptical empiricism, and building a system on what is smack in front of you. Possibilities have to be true, though. That's why you need dispositions in actuality.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11198 Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: It is definition of essence that makes things understandable.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92)
     A reaction: The aim of philosophy is understanding, which is achieved by successful explanation. I totally agree with this Aristotelian view, so neatly summarised by Aquinas.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
11206 The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Attribution is something mind brings to completion by constructing propositional connections and disconnections, basing itself on real-world unity possessed by the things being attributed to one another.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.102)
     A reaction: This compromise story seems to me to be exactly right. I take it that we respond to the real joints of nature, but using thought and language which is riddled with convention.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16469 Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: The domains in Plantinga's interpretation of Kripke's semantics are sets of essences, and the values of variables are essences. The values of predicates have to be functions from possible worlds to essences.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: I begin to think this is quite nice, as long as one doesn't take the commitment to the essences too seriously. For 'essence' read 'minimal identity'? But I take essences to be more than minimal, so use identities (which Kripke does?).
16470 Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
     Full Idea: For Plantinga, essences are entities in their own right and will have properties different from what instantiates them. Hence he will need individual essences of individual essences, distinct from the essences. I see no way to avoid a hierarchy of them.
     From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: This sounds devastating for Plantinga, but it is a challenge for traditional Aristotelians. Only a logician suffers from a hierarchy, but a scientist might have to live with an essence, which contains a super-essence.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
14663 Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1)
     A reaction: Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
19941 Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself [Anon (Leviticus)]
     Full Idea: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.
     From: Anon (Lev) (03: Book of Leviticus [c.700 BCE], 19.18)
     A reaction: Most Christians think Jesus originated this thought. Interestingly, this precedes Socrates, who taught a similar idea.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
11207 A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: When things are so related that one causes the other to exist, the cause can exist without what it causes but not vice versa.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.103)
     A reaction: This is open to question, if causes are supposed to be sufficient for effects. Presumably Aquinas would support the view that if the cause had not been, the effect would not have happened. But the current idea indicates the priority relation.