35 ideas
| 15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Someone first distinguishes a person's limbs and parts and asks your agreement that all the parts are identical with that unity, then ridicules you that you have to admit one is many, and indefinitely many, and again that the many are only only one thing. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 14e) | |
| A reaction: This is a passing aporia, but actually seems to approach the central mystery of the metaphysics of identity. A thing can't be a 'unity' if there are not things to unify? So what sorts of 'unification' are there? |
| 9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It will be ridiculous if our student knows the definition of the circle and of the divine sphere itself, but cannot recognize the human sphere and these our circles, used in housebuilding. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 62a) | |
| A reaction: This is the equivalent of being able to recite numbers, but not to count objects. It also resembles Molyneux's question (to Locke), of whether recognition by one sense entails recognition by others. Nice (and a bit anti-platonist!). |
| 9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The arithmetic of the many computes sums of unequal units, such as two armies, or two herds, ..but philosopher's arithmetic computes when it is guaranteed that none of those infinitely many units differed in the least from any of the others. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 56d) | |
| A reaction: But of course 'the many' are ironing out the differences too, when they say there are 'three armies'. Shocking snob, Plato. Even philosophers are interested in the difference between three armies and three platoons. |
| 15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Any blend [mixture] which does not have measure or the nature of proportion in any way whatsoever, of necessity destroys both its ingredients and, primarily, itself. It is truly no blend at all, but a kind of unblended disaster. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64e) | |
| A reaction: Obviously there can be chaotic mixtures, but I guess Plato is picking out mixtures about which we can say something |
| 14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Any kind of mixture that does not ...possess measure or the nature of proportion will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself. For there would be no blending in such cases but really an unconnected medley, and ruin what contains it. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64d) | |
| A reaction: My guess is that Plato is thinking of the decay of living things when they die, losing the proportions of psuché, and then applying this to the unity of inanimate objects as well. One might compare Leibniz's monads. |
| 4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If man is one, and the good is one, how are they supposed to exist? Do they stay the same even though they are found in many things at the same time, and are they then entirely separated from themselves, which seems most impossible of all? | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15a) | |
| A reaction: Presumably Plato anguishes over this because he thinks Forms are self-predicating (the Good is good). Big mistake. The Good fathers good particulars which resemble itself, but are diluted? |
| 15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It is through discourse that the same thing flits around, becoming one and many in all sorts of ways. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15d) | |
| A reaction: This is not scepticism about wholes on Plato's part, but a reminder of an obvious fact, that in thought we can break the world up and put it back together again. It is a touchstone of the debate, though. |
| 374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Someone can theoretically divide an object into constituent parts, concede that they are one object, and then claim that therefore the one is many and the many are one. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 14e) |
| 11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: To say than x has a property in a possible world is simply to say that x would have had the property if that world had been actual. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
| A reaction: Plantinga tries to defuse all the problems with identity across possible worlds, by hanging on to subjunctive verbs and modal modifiers. The point, though, was to explain these, or at least to try to give their logical form. |
| 11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: A possible world is just a maximal possible state of affairs. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
| A reaction: The key point here is that Plantinga includes the word 'possible' in his definition. Possibility defines the worlds, and so worlds cannot be used on their own to define possibility. |
| 11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: If the Socrates of the actual world has snubnosedness but Socrates-in-W does not, this is surely inconsistent with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, a principle than which none sounder can be conceived. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
| A reaction: However, we allow Socrates to differ over time while remaining the same Socrates, so some similar approach should apply here. In both cases we need some notion of what is essential to Socrates. But what unites aged 3 with aged 70? |
| 11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: We may say it makes no sense to say that Socrates exists at a world, if there is in principle no way of identifying him. ...But this is confused. To suppose Agnew was a precocious baby, we needn't be able to pick him from a gallery of babies. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I) | |
| A reaction: This seems a good point, and yet we have a space-time line joining adult Agnew with baby Agnew, and no such causal link is available between persons in different possible worlds. What would be the criterion in each case? |
| 11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: The Theory of Worldbound Individuals contends that no object exists in more than one possible world; this implies the outrageous view that - taking properties in the broadest sense - no object could have lacked any property that it in fact has. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II) | |
| A reaction: Leibniz is the best known exponent of this 'outrageous view', though Plantinga shows that Lewis may be seen in the same light, since only counterparts are found in possible worlds, not the real thing. The Theory does seem wrong. |
| 11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: While Socrates has no counterparts that lack self-identity, he does have counterparts that lack identity-with-Socrates. He alone has that - the property, that is, of being identical with the object that in fact instantiates Socrateity. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II) | |
| A reaction: I am never persuaded by arguments which rest on such dubious pseudo-properties. Whether or not a counterpart of Socrates has any sort of identity with Socrates cannot be prejudged, as it would beg the question. |
| 11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: It makes no sense to say I could have been someone else, yet Counterpart Theory implies not merely that I could have been distinct from myself, but that I would have been distinct from myself had things gone differently in even the most miniscule detail. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II) | |
| A reaction: A counterpart doesn't appear to be 'me being distinct from myself'. We have to combine counterparts over possible worlds with perdurance over time. I am a 'worm' of time-slices. Anything not in that worm is not strictly me. |
| 389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Could we attribute certainty to studying aspects of the world, such as how it arose, or acts, or is acted upon, when none of them ever was or will be constant? Of course not. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 59b) |
| 390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Moderation and proportion seem, in effect, to be beauty and excellence. So now this property we're looking for, goodness, has taken refuge in beauty. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64e) |
| 391 | The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If we are unable to net the good in a single concept, three must capture it: namely, beauty, proportion and truth. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 65a) | |
| A reaction: Very interesting. More illuminating than the discussion of the Good in 'Republic'. Is a handsome and honest murderer good? Is beauty part of the nature of the good, or a hallmark of it? |
| 392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Both intellect and pleasure are completely absolved of being the good itself, since they both lack independence, that is, sufficiency and perfection. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 67a) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be Plato disagreeing with Socrates, who sees reason and intellect as central to morality. Presumable he means that the good should be a primitive. Why is pleasure not sufficient? |
| 393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Good is supreme, followed by beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pure pleasure, then mixed pleasure. | |
| From: report of Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 67a) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: He tells us that pure pleasures are simple pleasures. Epicurus presumably read this. No mention of truth, unless that is part of reason. Why does he value beauty so highly? |
| 385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Living beings experience pleasures and pains which seem, and indeed are, false. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 42c) | |
| A reaction: The idea that there are 'authentic' pleasures and pains needs some investigation. Misguided anger is a false pain? Vanity is a false pleasure? |
| 5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18) | |
| A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent? |
| 387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A tiny little pleasure is, if uncontaminated by pain, always more pleasant, truer and finer than a large amount. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 53b) | |
| A reaction: More Platonic puritanism. Is a complete absence of pleasure the highest pleasure of all? I don't think I understand 'truer'. Why would a pleasure be false because it is intense? |
| 373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The pleasantness of pleasure is not in dispute, but where we say the majority of pleasures are bad, though some are good, you are attributing goodness to all of them. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 13b) | |
| A reaction: Bentham's plausible view is that the feeling of pleasure is always good, and the badness is in some other aspect of the event. Compare sadistic fantasy with sadistic action. |
| 379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Neither pleasure nor intellect comprises the good. If it did it would have to be sufficient and perfect. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 22b) | |
| A reaction: Seems sensible. I can't make sense of any vision of the good which consists of suppressing some aspect of human nature. (Hm. Our capacity for violence?) |
| 371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
| Full Idea: My contention is that reason, intellect, memory - along with correct belief and true calculation - are far better than pleasure for all creatures capable of attaining them. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 11b) | |
| A reaction: Why? Is it better to understand deeply, or to act well? Can we just say there is objective good and subjective good, and they have little in common? Depressed heroes. |
| 376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Try thinking about the life of pleasure without reason, and the life of reason without pleasure. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 20e) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that we see the two as more deeply entangled that Plato did. It would be hard to motivate reasoning if we didn't enjoy it. Pleasure without reason sound dire. |
| 382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It is unlikely that the gods feel pleasure or the opposite. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 33b) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 383. |
| 381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
| Full Idea: When harmony is being restored, and the natural state of harmony is approached, then pleasure arises. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 31d) | |
| A reaction: The supreme value of harmony was important to Plato, but most of us are less convinced, I suspect. The way to achieve harmony is to avoid anything stressful. |
| 386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Intensity of pleasure and pain is to be found not in a good state of body and soul, but in a worthless one. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 45e) | |
| A reaction: This just seems to be Plato's puritanism. How can you criticise someone for experience genuine intense pain? Experiencing intense pleasure is no crime, but pursuit of it might be. |
| 388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A hedonist must say that someone who happens to be feeling pain rather than pleasure is, as long as the pain lasts, a bad man, even if he is the most virtuous man in the world. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 55b) |
| 377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Would you, Protarchus, gladly live your whole life experiencing only the greatest pleasure? Would you think you were still lacking anything? | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 21a) | |
| A reaction: the pleasure machine problem |
| 378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is not the life of a human being, but the life of a jellyfish. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 21c) |
| 5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11) | |
| A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing. |
| 5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23) | |
| A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil? |