8 ideas
8714 | Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true [Field,H] |
Full Idea: The fictionalist can say that the sense in which '2+2=4' is true is pretty much the same as the sense in which 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true. They are true 'according to a well-known story', or 'according to standard mathematics'. | |
From: Hartry Field (Realism, Mathematics and Modality [1989], 1.1.1), quoted by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.3 | |
A reaction: The roots of this idea are in Carnap. Fictionalism strikes me as brilliant, but poisonous in large doses. Novels can aspire to artistic truth, or to documentary truth. We invent a fiction, and nudge it slowly towards reality. |
3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
Full Idea: I have never thought that anything more is required to reveal a substance than its various attributes. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fifth Objections [1641], 360) |
3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
Full Idea: You can't prove that Praxiteles never made any statues on the grounds that he did not get from within himself the marble from which he sculpted them. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fifth Objections [1641], 362) |
3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
Full Idea: How do you know that there is no idea of colour in a man born blind? | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fifth Objections [1641], 363) |
3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle, just as necessary existence is a perfection in the idea of God. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fifth Objections [1641], 383) |
3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |
Full Idea: In the case of God necessary existence is in fact a property in the strictest sense of the term, since it applies to him alone and forms a part of his essence as it does of no other thing | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fifth Objections [1641], 383) |
1474 | Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG] |
Full Idea: Moral evil may be acceptable to a benevolent God because it is the only way to allow genuine free will, which may have a supreme value in creation (even if we are unsure what it is). | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Free Will Defence [1965], Pref.) by PG - Db (ideas) |
1475 | It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG] |
Full Idea: Physical evil (e.g. earthquakes) may be attributable to a fallen angel (Satan), who is the enemy of God, and this is enough to retain the idea that God is omnipotent and benevolent, and yet evil exists. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Free Will Defence [1965], III) by PG - Db (ideas) |