14664
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Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
A 'necessary being' is one that exists in every possible world; and only some objects - numbers, properties, pure sets, propositions, states of affairs, God - have this distinction.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 2)
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A reaction:
This a very odd list, though it is fairly orthodox among philosophers trained in modern modal logic. At the very least it looks rather parochial to me.
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13289
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Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
Structures make available positions or places for objects, and place restraints on the type of constituent, and on their configuration. ...These lead to restrictions on the number of objects, and on which parts of the structure are invariable.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 9.6)
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A reaction:
[compressed] That's a pretty good first shot at saying what a structure is, which I have so far not discovered any other writer willing to do. I take this to be an exploration of what Aristotle meant by 'form'.
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13280
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Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
The statue and the clay appear to differ in modal properties (such as being able to survive squashing), and temporal properties (coming into existence after the lump of clay), and in constitution (only the statue is constituted of the clay).
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.7.2)
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A reaction:
I think the modal properties are the biggest problem here. You can't say a thing and its constitution are different objects, as they are necessarily connected. Structure comes into existence at t, but the structure isn't the whole object.
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14496
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Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
The notion of structure or form, far from being a mysterious and causally inert invention of philosophers, lies at the very center of many scientific and other rigorous endeavours, such as mathematics, logic, linguistics, chemistry and music.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro)
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A reaction:
This echoes my own belief exactly, and places Aristotle at the centre of the modern stage. Her list of subjects is intriguing, and will need a bit of thought.
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13279
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There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
The view that constitution is identity has many versions: eliminativism (van Inwagen), identity relative to time (Gallois), identity relativized to sort (Geach), four-dimensionalism (Lewis, Sider), contingent identity (Gibbard), dominant kinds (Burke).
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 7.2.7.2 n17)
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A reaction:
[she offers other names- useful footnote] Eliminativism says there is no identity. Gallois's view is Heraclitus. Geach seems to deny nature, since sorts are partly conventional. 4-D, nah! Gibbard: it could be the thing but lack its identity? Kinds wrong.
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13266
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Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
The modern theory of parts and wholes was intended primarily to replace set theory; in this way, wholes came out looking as much like sets as they possibly could, without set theory's commitment to an infinite hierarchy of abstract objects.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro)
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A reaction:
A very nice clarificatory remark, which explains well this rather baffling phenomenon of people who think there is nothing more to a whole than a pile of parts, as if a scrap heap were the same as a fleet of motor cars.
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14500
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Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
A commitment to wholes is a commitment to entities that are numerically distinct from their parts (by Leibniz's Law, they don't share all of their properties - the parts typically exist, but the whole doesn't, prior to its creation).
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 3.1)
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A reaction:
Presumably in classical mereology no act of 'creation' is needed, since all the parts in the universe already form all the possible wholes into which they might combine, however bizarrely.
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14666
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Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
Socrates is a contingent being; his essence, however, is not. Properties, like propositions and possible worlds, are necessary beings. If Socrates had not existed, his essence would have been unexemplified, but not non-existent.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 4)
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A reaction:
This is a distinctive Plantinga view, of which I can make little sense. I take it that Socrates used to have an essence. Being dead, the essence no longer exists, but when we talk about Socrates it is largely this essence to which we refer. OK?
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14662
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Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
The idea of possible worlds has delivered insights on logical possibility (de dicto and de re), propositions, properties and sets, counterfactuals, time and temporal relations, causal determinism, the ontological argument, and the problem of evil.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], Intro)
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A reaction:
This date (1976) seems to be the high-water mark for enthusiasm about possible worlds. I suppose if we just stick to 'insights' rather than 'answers' then the big claim might still be acceptable. Which problems are created by possible worlds?
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16472
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Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
Plantinga's critics worry that the metaphysics is actualist in name only, since it is achieved only by populating the actual world with entities whose nature is explained in terms of merely possible things that would exemplify them if anything did.
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From:
comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
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A reaction:
Plantinga seems a long way from the usual motivation for actualism, which is probably sceptical empiricism, and building a system on what is smack in front of you. Possibilities have to be true, though. That's why you need dispositions in actuality.
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7880
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If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
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Full Idea:
An ornithological Mary might know everything theoretical about kestrels, but be blind from birth, then have her sight restored. She now knows "That bird eats mice", so visual kestrels must be ontologically distinct from theoretical ones.
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From:
comment on Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 6.3
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A reaction:
A nice reductio, and I think this pinpoints best what is wrong with the knowledge argument. Knowledge, and the means of acquiring it, are two distinct things. When I see x, I don't acquire knowledge of x, AND knowledge of my seeing x.
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7377
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Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
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Full Idea:
It seems obvious that Mary will learn something about the world when she is released from her black-and-white room; but then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete; she had all the physical information, so there is more to have.
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From:
Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982], §1)
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A reaction:
This is Jackson's famous 'knowledge argument', which seems to me misconceived. Since I don't think phenomenal colours are properties of objects (Idea 5456), Mary learns more about herself, and about her means of acquiring knowledge.
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16469
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Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
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Full Idea:
The domains in Plantinga's interpretation of Kripke's semantics are sets of essences, and the values of variables are essences. The values of predicates have to be functions from possible worlds to essences.
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From:
report of Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
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A reaction:
I begin to think this is quite nice, as long as one doesn't take the commitment to the essences too seriously. For 'essence' read 'minimal identity'? But I take essences to be more than minimal, so use identities (which Kripke does?).
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16470
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Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
For Plantinga, essences are entities in their own right and will have properties different from what instantiates them. Hence he will need individual essences of individual essences, distinct from the essences. I see no way to avoid a hierarchy of them.
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From:
comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
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A reaction:
This sounds devastating for Plantinga, but it is a challenge for traditional Aristotelians. Only a logician suffers from a hierarchy, but a scientist might have to live with an essence, which contains a super-essence.
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14663
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Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1)
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A reaction:
Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me.
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13287
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Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
Candidate species concepts can be intrinsic: morphological, physiological or genetic similarity; or relational: biology such as interbreeding and reproductive isolation, ecology, such as mate recognition in a niche, or phylogenetics (ancestor relations).
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], 8.4.1)
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A reaction:
She says the relational ones are more popular, but I gather they all hit problems. See John Dupré on the hopelessness of the whole task.
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