Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Free Will Defence', 'Reference and Essence: seven appendices' and 'Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer')'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N]
     Full Idea: Insofar as identity seems vague, it is provably mistaken. If it is vague whether x and y are identical (as in the Ship of Theseus), then x,y is definitely not the same as x,x, since the first pair is indeterminate and the second pair isn't.
     From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], App I)
     A reaction: [compressed; Gareth Evans 1978 made a similar point] This strikes me as begging the question in the Ship case, since we are shoehorning the new ship into either the slot for x or the slot for y, but that was what we couldn’t decide. No rough identity?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck]
     Full Idea: Galileo argued that there is no such thing as heat (and hence also as colour) in the external world, so there is no reason to conclude from colour-blindness that we cannot know the truth about the world.
     From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1
     A reaction: This key idea, taken up by Gassendi, Descartes and Locke, seems to me to be one of the most important (and, in retrospect, rather obvious) facts ever worked out by the human mind. Why does anyone still doubt it?
Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo]
     Full Idea: I think tastes, odours, colours, and so on are mere names as far as the objects are concerned, and only reside in consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated.
     From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]), quoted by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3
     A reaction: A nice bold assertion of the primary/secondary distinction from the first great scientist. I agree, and to disagree (and hence side with Berkeley and Hume) is to head for metaphsical and epistemological confusion.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: The modern idea of explaining with mechanisms became current in the 17th century when Galileo articulated a geometrico-mechanical form of explanation based on Archimedes' simple machines. This became the 'mechanical philosophy'.
     From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 5.2
     A reaction: So is Archimedes the source? I would say that mechanical explanation is just commonsense, and is predominant in all human thinking, even in tiny infants.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N]
     Full Idea: Kripke and Putnam made unsubstantiated claims, indeed false claims, to the effect that the theory of direct reference has nontrivial essentialist import.
     From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], Pref to Exp Ed)
     A reaction: Kripke made very few claims, and is probably innocent of the charge. Most people agree with Salmon that you can't derive metaphysics from a theory of reference.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo]
     Full Idea: The great book of the universe cannot be understood unless one can understand the language in which it is written - the language of mathematics.
     From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623], VI.232)
     A reaction: Nice, though one might say that humans created the language of maths to help them discuss the patterns they perceived in nature. Maybe what is special is order, and all order can be described mathematically.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG]
     Full Idea: Moral evil may be acceptable to a benevolent God because it is the only way to allow genuine free will, which may have a supreme value in creation (even if we are unsure what it is).
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Free Will Defence [1965], Pref.) by PG - Db (ideas)
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG]
     Full Idea: Physical evil (e.g. earthquakes) may be attributable to a fallen angel (Satan), who is the enemy of God, and this is enough to retain the idea that God is omnipotent and benevolent, and yet evil exists.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Free Will Defence [1965], III) by PG - Db (ideas)