14664
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Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
A 'necessary being' is one that exists in every possible world; and only some objects - numbers, properties, pure sets, propositions, states of affairs, God - have this distinction.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 2)
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A reaction:
This a very odd list, though it is fairly orthodox among philosophers trained in modern modal logic. At the very least it looks rather parochial to me.
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14666
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Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
Socrates is a contingent being; his essence, however, is not. Properties, like propositions and possible worlds, are necessary beings. If Socrates had not existed, his essence would have been unexemplified, but not non-existent.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 4)
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A reaction:
This is a distinctive Plantinga view, of which I can make little sense. I take it that Socrates used to have an essence. Being dead, the essence no longer exists, but when we talk about Socrates it is largely this essence to which we refer. OK?
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14662
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Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
The idea of possible worlds has delivered insights on logical possibility (de dicto and de re), propositions, properties and sets, counterfactuals, time and temporal relations, causal determinism, the ontological argument, and the problem of evil.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], Intro)
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A reaction:
This date (1976) seems to be the high-water mark for enthusiasm about possible worlds. I suppose if we just stick to 'insights' rather than 'answers' then the big claim might still be acceptable. Which problems are created by possible worlds?
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16472
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Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
Plantinga's critics worry that the metaphysics is actualist in name only, since it is achieved only by populating the actual world with entities whose nature is explained in terms of merely possible things that would exemplify them if anything did.
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From:
comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
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A reaction:
Plantinga seems a long way from the usual motivation for actualism, which is probably sceptical empiricism, and building a system on what is smack in front of you. Possibilities have to be true, though. That's why you need dispositions in actuality.
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5927
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I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross]
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Full Idea:
The sensum-theory seems to me less probable than a causal theory of perception, which regards sensuous experience as not being apprehension at all, but a set of mental events produced by external bodies on our bodies and minds.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV)
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A reaction:
The point is that there is no third item between the object and the mind, which has to be 'apprehended'. Sense-data give a good account of delusions (where we apprehend the 'data', but not the real object). I think I agree with Ross.
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16469
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Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
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Full Idea:
The domains in Plantinga's interpretation of Kripke's semantics are sets of essences, and the values of variables are essences. The values of predicates have to be functions from possible worlds to essences.
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From:
report of Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
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A reaction:
I begin to think this is quite nice, as long as one doesn't take the commitment to the essences too seriously. For 'essence' read 'minimal identity'? But I take essences to be more than minimal, so use identities (which Kripke does?).
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16470
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Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
For Plantinga, essences are entities in their own right and will have properties different from what instantiates them. Hence he will need individual essences of individual essences, distinct from the essences. I see no way to avoid a hierarchy of them.
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From:
comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
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A reaction:
This sounds devastating for Plantinga, but it is a challenge for traditional Aristotelians. Only a logician suffers from a hierarchy, but a scientist might have to live with an essence, which contains a super-essence.
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14663
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Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
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Full Idea:
Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs.
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From:
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1)
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A reaction:
Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me.
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7259
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Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J]
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Full Idea:
Ross held that moral principles are self-evident to us, meaning that no more is needed to reveal their truth to us as general guides to behaviour than what is the case before us, not that we can discover a moral truth just by thinking about it.
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From:
report of W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930]) by Jonathan Dancy - Intuitionism
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A reaction:
This seems to be a crucial distinction between two types of intuitionism, one that is purely a priori, and one that chimes in with the 'particularist' reading of virtue theory. The former is implausible and much attacked; the latter is more interesting.
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5930
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All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross]
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Full Idea:
Everyone would prefer the second of two universes, if each had equal vice and virtue, and each had equal pleasure and pain, but in the first the virtuous were miserable and the vicious happy, while in the second universe it was the opposite.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V)
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A reaction:
This strikes me as a very good example of an intuition which it is hard to resist. Would some vile Mafia boss really want heaven to be full of murderers, while good-hearted and kind people all went to hell?
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5921
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We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
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Full Idea:
While it can be intelligently asked whether the pleasant or beautiful has value, it cannot be intelligently asked whether the good has value, since the good is just to be valuable.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV)
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A reaction:
It is simply tautological that goodness has value, and that valuable things are good. But an assassin might 'value' a 'good' way of killing someone, or an instrument of torture. We might say "He values x, but x is bad". Still, he must think x is good.
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5932
|
The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
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Full Idea:
Four things seem to be intrinsically good - virtue, pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V)
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A reaction:
I greatly admire a philosopher who has the courage to assert such a thing, in the face of centuries of scepticism about anyone's ability to even get started in this area. We need the bold assertions first; we can work back to doubts later, if necessary.
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5910
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The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
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Full Idea:
There are three main things which are intrinsically good - virtue, knowledge, and with certain limitations, pleasure.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II)
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A reaction:
This combines the views of most of the main schools of ancient Greece. For Socrates, knowledge delivers the others; for Aristippus, pleasure eclipses the others; for Zeno of Citium, virtue is all that matters. Ross is a pluralist, like Aristotle.
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5899
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If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
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Full Idea:
If it is our duty to produce one or other of two or more different states of affairs, without its being our duty to produce one rather than the another, then in such a case each of these acts will be right, and none will be our duty.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I)
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A reaction:
An elegant piece of analytical philosophy, which shows fairly conclusively that 'right' is distinct from 'duty', as well as being distinct from 'good'. We can generalise about right actions, without identifying anyone who has the duty to perform them.
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5938
|
Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
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Full Idea:
The acquisition of pleasure for oneself rarely, if ever, presents itself as a duty, while the attainment of moral goodness habitually presents itself as a duty; this surely points to an infinity superiority of virtue over pleasure.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI)
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A reaction:
You have to be a fully paid-up intuitionist (like Ross) before you can assert such gloriously confident judgements about duty. Personal pleasure could become a duty if you had mistakenly denied it to yourself for a long time.
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5931
|
All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
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Full Idea:
Can anyone doubt that it would be a better state of the universe if, with equality in respect of virtue and of pleasure, and of the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, the persons in the universe had a far greater understanding of its laws and nature?
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V)
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A reaction:
Another nice test of our intuitions, with which it is hard to disagree. This technique of argument is found in Plato's Republic (360e onwards). See also Aristotle Idea 543. There are some intuitions which you expect to be universal.
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5939
|
Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
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Full Idea:
The doctrine that morality is entirely social, that all duty consists in promoting the good of others, seems to me profound mistake; intellectual integrity, the love of truth for its own sake, is among the most salient elements in a good moral character.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI)
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A reaction:
The objection to this might be than an ideal love of truth is a social virtue, because it produces reliable and useful citizens. Would it be immoral for Robinson Crusoe to live by fictions, instead of facing the depressing truth?
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5905
|
We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
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Full Idea:
On reflection it seems clear that pleasure is not the only thing in life that we think good in itself, that for instance we think the possession of a good character, or an intelligent understanding of the world, as good or better.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II)
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A reaction:
Aristotle and Plato would obviously agree with this. I agree, as I cannot comprehend the claim that pleasure is self-evidently the good, simply because it feels nice. Why shouldn't evil feel nice?
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5929
|
No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]
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Full Idea:
If anyone thinks pleasure alone is the good, it seems to me enough to ask whether, of two states of the universe holding equal amounts of pleasure, we should really think no better of one in with virtuous dispositions and actions than of its opposite.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V)
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A reaction:
An important technique of argument, analagous to scientific experiment. Hold the variable which is considered to be uniquely vital constant, and see if anyone cares if some other variable changes. It is a good argument.
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18622
|
Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross]
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Full Idea:
To make a promise is not merely to adapt an ingenious device for promoting the general well-being; it is to put oneself in a new relation to one person in particular, creating a specifically new duty to him, not reducible to promoting general well-being.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], p.38), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 2.3.a
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A reaction:
Of course, a politician might make a promise to society as a whole, but even there Ross seems to be right. 'I'll do it' is not the same as 'I promise you all I'll do it', which is more personal.
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22478
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The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot]
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Full Idea:
The key notion is the concept of need, …as when we say what a plant or animal of a certain species needs to have, …and what its operative features, such roots, leaves, hearts and lungs, need to do.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.164)
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A reaction:
Good. That takes it away from the idea of a function, which could be possessed by an inanimate machine (even though that still entails success and failure). Strictly, we need oxygen, but the goodness resides in the lungs.
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5909
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Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG]
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Full Idea:
The prima facie duties are of fidelity, gratitude, justice, beneficence (the act, rather than the motive), self-improvement, and non-maleficence.
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From:
report of W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
I admire anyone who has the courage to make a statement like this. A thousand analytical philosophers sharpen their knives for the attack, all armed with Cartesian or empirical scepticism. But to deny these duties is to drop out of society.
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5916
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Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross]
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Full Idea:
A 'right' does not stand for a purely moral notion; it began, I suppose, by standing for a legal notion, and its usage has broadened out so as to include certain things that cannot be claimed at law, but it is not yet correlative to duty.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II App I)
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A reaction:
Presumably 'natural rights' are those which ought to be legal rights - or they are so obvious that there is no point in discussing legal rights until the natural rights are granted. Don't we make laws because we perceive rights?
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5915
|
Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross]
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Full Idea:
On the whole, since we mean by a right something that can be justly claimed, we should probably say that animals have not rights, not because the claim to humane treatment would not be just if it were made, but because they cannot make it.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II App I)
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A reaction:
This would also apply to a human being who was, for some reason, unable to claim their rights. If Amnesty can claim rights for prisoners, presumably we can claim rights for dumb animals. Ross is on weak ground.
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